



TRANSCRIPT OF THE ADDRESS BY SERGEY RYABKOV, DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION

Questions and Answers

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[**KHLOPKOV**, *unofficial translation from Russian*]¹ Since I am the chairman, please allow me put the first two questions. Mr. Ryabkov, I would like to ask you about the new 5+2 format of dialogue on the FMCT which emerged recently. Can you tell us what the goals and objectives of this 5+2 format are?

My second question is this. After the Moscow meeting there has been a feeling of a certain vacuum on the Iran dialogue. Meanwhile, information about the two other levels of the dialogue is not being made public. What is the current state of the dialogue in the 5+1 format at the additional two levels created as a result of the Moscow meeting? Thank you.

[**RYABKOV**, *unofficial translation from Russian*]² I'm sure you know that for a long time we have been working to adopt a balanced action program at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva. By "balanced" I mean, of course, a program which takes into account our priorities. One of the top priorities for us is to prevent the placement of weapons in outer space. But we also recognize the importance of the other components of this work. One of them is to develop a treaty banning the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. This issue has lately been at the focus of international attention. It is no secret that one of the "+2" countries you mentioned is Pakistan, which is voicing serious objections about the prospects of the launch of negotiations. We are trying to stimulate the discussion, inasmuch as possible. We are trying to find creative solutions to this problem, a way out of the present deadlock, because we believe that the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva remains the optimal platform for the new treaty to be developed, based on the Shannon mandate. Naturally, we cannot support any options for bypassing the consensus mechanisms and creating alternative platforms for these negotiations, given that such an important party as Pakistan has not agreed to the launch of these talks at the Disarmament Conference. This is one of the objectives being pursued in the 5+2 format, i.e. the nuclear five plus two other countries.

¹ Anton **Khlopkov**, Director, Center for Energy and Security Studies (CENESS); Chairman, The 2012 Moscow Nonproliferation Conference, Russian Federation.

² Sergey **Ryabkov**, Deputy Foreign Minister, Russian Federation.



As for Iran and the Iranian issue, the current state of affairs is actually not quite as bad as it might appear to those who are judging the situation only by newspaper headlines or by the number of meetings. Indeed, we continue to hold meetings; some of them involve Iranian representatives, some of them don't. As for the continuation of the actual negotiating process, on July 3rd there was a meeting in Istanbul of the group of six international mediators with Iranian representatives at the level of deputies. That is the next level where we continued to discuss among experts the proposals which the parties exchanged during the Baghdad and Moscow rounds of talks in May and June. Later on there were telephone and email exchanges. I believe we are approaching new meetings and discussions. In other words, the process continues: we are having real dialogue and specific discussions. Work is also under way in Vienna, where the IAEA secretariat has just held another round of discussions with Iranian representatives. The process continues, although we do need to step it up – we must not lose the momentum, we must not allow any pauses. The nature of the negotiating process is such that if we allow too long a pause, the participants end up returning to the discussion of issues which we thought we had already agreed on. As a result we may lose the dynamics of the talks. We don't want that to happen, so we want to continue the negotiating process on all levels. But this two-level approach is not a Russian invention. It was actually proposed by the Iranians themselves. Members of the group of six then concluded that this format is viable and interesting. Such a conclusion has been borne out by recent developments.

[FITZPATRICK]³ Thank you very much, Anton. Thank you, Mr. Minister. It's very good of you to engage in this discussion with us. To follow up on the Iran issue, yesterday the Interfax news agency quoted you as saying, according to the English translation, "We see no signs that there is a military dimension to Iran's nuclear program." No signs. I wonder if this is a mistranslation. In English "signs" means indications, it does not mean proof. If you had said "there is no proof", then everyone would agree. But the IAEA put out a report last November with an Annex of 65 paragraphs of indications of possible military dimensions - most of which were in the past, but some of which appeared to be continuing. So, can you perhaps elaborate what you mean by what in English was quoted as "no signs".

[MIZIN, *unofficial translation from Russian*]⁴ Mr. Ryabkov, thank you for outlining our position on the NPT in such great detail. Speaking of Article VI, these conditions remind me of the Soviet position on disarmament in the early 1980s. The principle was, nothing is decided until everything is decided. Later on, as we all know, President Gorbachev decided to make the intermediate and short-range missiles a separate issue, and we started to make some progress. Should we expect a certain pause in the arms control process owing to the U.S. elections? Or is there some individual issue which we can focus on separately, and make some progress on it? Thank you.

³ Mark **Fitzpatrick**, Senior Fellow for Non-proliferation, International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), United States / United Kingdom.

⁴ Victor **Mizin**, Deputy Director, Institute of International Studies, Moscow State Institute of International Relations (MGIMO), Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Russian Federation.



[**RYABKOV**] This is exactly the right translation, which Interfax did, because – let me translate myself into English. I said, “My ne vidim nikakikh priznakov” - full stop. “Nikakikh priznakov”, full stop. “No signs, we see no signs whatsoever”, full stop. “No signs.” And I will explain why we are saying so. We do think that the Iranian side has shown over a considerable period of time a great deal of readiness to cooperate with the IAEA, according to its safeguards agreement. The Iranian side, after a period of more open approach to this issue, withdrew from application of modified Code 3.1 and the Additional Protocol, and thus diminished the space of transparency, to put it this way. But within the scope of their readiness to cooperate, they cooperate with the Agency in good faith. This is our very firm conviction and assessment. And the IAEA, and the Director General in person, in a series of reports, said that all declared nuclear material is accounted for, and no diversion is taking place of this declared nuclear material.

Well, declared and undeclared, remaining issues, alleged studies - all this is with us, and if you go further into Interfax, readout of the interview, you will see that immediately after this “no signs” problem I mentioned that they need, the Iranian side need to do more in terms of cooperating with the Agency to remove the remaining issues, to remove any doubts that the international community may have with respect to what they otherwise may have done, or what may have been of reasons for others to say that there is no full confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of the Iranian nuclear program. So we have it both ways. We think that we cannot just ignore what has been done by Iranians in the area of cooperation with IAEA, but we also think that they need to do more. So I think this translation is very accurate.

[*Unofficial translation from Russian*] I believe we have approached a threshold where we no longer have this luxury, we no longer have the reserves at our disposal which we could put to use in an energetic, rapid and speedy manner, without thinking too much about the consequences of using up this resource. I mean the numerical resource in the area of weapons, in the absence of any changes in other areas which affect our security. I am not trying to come up with artificial excuses or to avoid, on some plausible-sounding political pretext, a difficult conversation with our partners. I am merely stating the facts. All the problems which I have highlighted in my speech require an increasingly urgent resolution. We are not proposing any specific solutions in this document – that should be the subject of discussions and negotiations. We are continuing certain discussions in this area. But it is too early to talk about any solutions. One thing is clear though: we should not expect a repeat of the past situations whereby Moscow and Washington could reach an agreement on some very serious but separate aspects of strategic stability outside of the general context. The international situation has changed, so we should not expect a repeat of this. Also, in the military-political aspect of our relations many things have changed beyond recognition. That is why we need new approaches here.

[**M. SULTAN**]⁵ Sir, I’ve got two questions. It is heartening to see that Russia has got a positive stance on the nonproliferation treaty. But I would like to solicit your views

⁵ Maria **Sultan**, Director General, South Asian Strategic Stability Institute (SASSI), Pakistan.



for the induction of the missile defense system by India into South Asia. How would you see this development? That's question number one, and number two, how do you see the Indo-US deal in its implications for the NPT, considering the fact that it has got no verification mechanisms which have been put in place through a legally binding nonproliferation commitment by India. It is a protocol, which has been signed by India with the IAEA, and as a result the Indian nuclear industry is allowed to cooperate with all other members of the IAEA, for peaceful uses of nuclear energy. So in this case, how do you see the future of industry cooperation with countries which are not party to the NPT, and here my reference is to Pakistan. How would you see the possibility of developing new criteria which would allow the NPT to be, perhaps, re-written, or re-thought of, with much more concrete ideas to support it?

[**SAGHAFI-AMERI**]⁶ My question is, in fact, in continuation of the previous question regarding the level of nuclear arms and nuclear disarmament dialogue that exists between Russia and the United States. If we bring into view the ballistic missile defense system, which is very controversial right now, in their dialogue concerning nuclear weapons - unfortunately, the US, as usual, has pointed its finger towards Iran for justifying for establishing that system, although we all know what are the main designs for that system. I would like to know your opinion regarding the process that you are pursuing in this field. And also, in the fields of nuclear disarmament, having more than 27,000 nuclear arms, which is very worrying to everybody. Thank you.

[**RYABKOV**] First, on missile defense in regard to South Asia. Let me say the following thing here. We are concerned of the overall, general, global trend towards more available, more accessible, more affordable technologies in the areas that directly affect the situation in the area of strategic stability. I will not enter into related aspects of this file, specifically to what India is doing in different areas, because I'd prefer that I talk on core problems. And one of the core problems for us in the area of our national security is the evolution of the US global missile defense system. You may ask, why Russia is more concerned of the US missile defense when India is trying to build its own missile defense system. We are more concerned with the US system because the US system is more advanced, because it's more global, because there are plans to go beyond the existing first phase of the Phased Adaptive Approach, and go over from here into the second, and then third and fourth phases, where technology will be combined with high mobility, with new sensors, with additional assets, most probably, in the space. It would mean that the overall capability of the US to affect adversely the Russian strategic deterrent is, in our view, at that point would become something that cannot be neglected, and would require some response, some kind of response. And compared to all this, what India is contemplating is very different. And therefore we may see what will happen there.

On the issue of criteria and Nuclear Suppliers Group, you may know that it's not necessarily good for me just to speak into microphone on all the intricacies of this process. The major point here is that India has an excellent nonproliferation record, and it's recognized by vast majority, by overwhelming majority of countries at least,

⁶ Nasser **Saghafi-Ameri**, Former Senior Diplomat and Independent Scholar, Iran.



to put it this way. Therefore, an effort was undertaken at Nuclear Suppliers Group to develop a set of criteria for transfer of technologies that has been approved, that would allow for unimpeded cooperation with India in this area. And I think it's useful, and it's good, and it shows that the international community is in no way trying to, you know, maintain what may be perceived as artificial obstacles to reasonable and viable and useful cooperation in a very crucial area.

To the issue of what's next in terms of missile defense and strategic offensive arms reductions, let me first mention that the figure of 27,000 is taken from somewhere in early to mid-1980s. We have 1,550 operatively deployed warheads, according to the New START treaty, 700 deployed and 800 deployed and non-deployed delivery vehicles, so the difference between 27,000 and 1,550 is huge. Therefore to come further down in these numbers is a big problem, is a huge question, whether it is something that is possible, and if so, what needs to be in place before we say, look, we may go further down. I tried to explain this in my starting remarks, and we are in constant discussions on this issue, both with the United States and with others for that case, because the relevance of the others', quote-unquote, capabilities in this area, is growing and has grown tremendously, so one cannot just put it aside. And I urge representatives of those countries who possess nuclear weapons to seriously consider this situation and to take this into very thorough analysis against their own obligations according to Article VI for those countries who are parties to NPT, and against the general broad course of discussion, the mainstream of this discussion for those countries who stay aside from NPT.

[KIMBALL]⁷ Thank you for your remarks, Mr. Minister. I wanted to ask you if you could elaborate on the negotiations process with Iran in the context of the P5+1. You said, and I agree, that the process must continue. But I think we all here would agree that there do need to be some results from the process at some point. And I was wondering if you could comment on how the differences between the P5+1 proposal might be squared with that of the Iranian position. Reports are that there are gaps between the two positions. What specific ideas is Russia putting forward or the P5+1 group, that could create some confidence-building steps that address the most urgent proliferation issues in Iranian case?

And just very quickly, I wanted to respectfully correct you on the Nuclear Suppliers Group. The decision by the NSG just last year to limit the transfer of reprocessing and enrichment technology effectively rules out the transfer of such technology to states like India that don't have full scope safeguards. And I would expect that Russia and other suppliers recognize that in their nuclear cooperation agreements with New Delhi. So there is a limitation on certain kinds of cooperation with India. Thank you.

[TENG]⁸ Thank you, Minister. As everybody knows that the missile defense program by the United States is one of the largest difficulties in the relations between Russia and the US, and now the United States is enhancing its missile defense capability in Asia Pacific Region. Actually there has been a long debate in China whether, you

⁷ Daryl **Kimball**, Executive Director, Arms Control Association, United States.

⁸ **Teng** Jianqun, Director, Center for Arms Control and International Security Studies, China.



know, Russia and China can cooperate in countering such a project. My question is, is Russia going to launch an initiative of such cooperation with China? Thank you.

[RYABKOV] Thank you. I thank both of you. With respect to our talks – our, that is, in 3+3 talks with Iran - it goes without saying that these talks are difficult. But some talks are better than no talks, that's obvious. And second, I think we have entered a phase at these discussions where, exactly as you pointed out, we have been able, for the first time ever, to start talking issues that are at the core of the whole debate. It is common knowledge already that the international community is deeply concerned with the Iranian enrichment till the level close of 20 per cent. It's equally known that the basis of the Iranian position constitutes of, I would say, two things. If the Iranian representatives are here they may correct me, but this is my reading of their position, which is, they want a formal recognition of the Iranian right to enrich, and they claim this is an integral and inseparable part of the whole range of their rights, according to the NPT. And secondly, they also want to ensure that apart from this recognition an arrangement is achieved where sanctions are dismantled and the whole file is returned to the International Atomic Energy Agency.

Positions are well apart, I agree, and it's really hard to bridge them. The question of how to move to the endgame, to a real deal-breaker, is the very crucial one for any negotiator. We, as a very faithful member of the group of 3+3, have offered our good offices to the others at the group, and to the Iranians for that case, and shared with them some ideas on what we believe is the final resolution of this problem, and how to go to this, how to reach this place. The final resolution was described by us as an arrangement where the full scope of the Iranian rights, including the right to enrich, is formally recognized by the international community in exchange - and this is the crucial element - in exchange for full and comprehensive international control over their nuclear program. Now, it would mean, at first place, the Iranian return to compliance with the Additional Protocol and modified Code 3.1, combined with the continuous implementation of their safeguards agreement. It would ensure a sufficient degree of insights by the international community in their program so that confidence in the exclusively peaceful character of that program is re-established. When this deal is achieved, then sanctions, both UN Security Council-approved sanctions and unilateral actions by some nations and associations of nations would be removed.

In this formula everything is important. Whereas the backbone of agreement is the recognition of the right in exchange for control, and then lifting of sanctions. The sequencing of events is equally important, and we have of course some gap between this idea and the Iranian view towards this whole proposition. We have also proposed how to reach this when we introduced the so-called Lavrov plan. This is a set of measures based on the principles of reciprocity and the step-by-step approach. How to gradually build up confidence? I am not going to explain all the details, they are cumbersome and they are boring. I will only say that this is something that we continuously believe in, and this is something that we advocate for, and we have some hope, some elements of this approach – but of course, not the major ideas - are, I believe, now firmly rooted in the body of the talks. We will follow on. I think it's a viable way.



The talks enjoy very, very down-to-earth professional atmospherics, the talks are being conducted with a very obvious political will on the part of everyone to move towards compromise. Let me also tell you that, being a member of the 3+3 group, Russia in no way withdraws from the collectively approved position of the group. This position is something different, and let's Lady Ashton and her people talk on behalf of the whole group. We subscribe under this proposition, and we duly perform our function as a member of the group in all the exchanges we have, both with others at the group and with the Iranians. As I said in the course of two most recent rounds, one in Baghdad and another one in June in Moscow, the parties - that is the group and the Iranians - have exchanged, formally exchanged, their position, and it would be very important not to lose the momentum and continue these talks so that the core differences and major arguments of both parties are addressed.

On the second question, or rather, on reprocessing technologies not being element of the technologies allowed by the commonly agreed criteria, I would say, NSG's decision, as any decision, is a result of major compromise, and it's understood so by everyone. And it by all means enhances changes for useful cooperation with Indian counterparts, and we welcome it. We will work, as always, in full and complete compliance with all our international commitments and obligations, definitely in this area as well.

The issue of eventual Russian-Chinese project in the area of missile defense - well, it goes without saying that growing American capabilities in what for us is Far East and Asia Pacific, they are not moving forward unnoticed by the Russian side. We equally follow what is happening in this area by terms of US cooperation with its allies in Asia. There are some important developments, much has been already achieved. But to come back to our position on all this, I will tell you that the reasons to be concerned with the US development in this area are not only related to the third and fourth phases of the US Phased Adaptive Approach in terms of technologies and capabilities of interceptors, sensors and so on and so forth. They are also related to the very geography and the ability of the US to rapidly deploy these assets in different places - not necessarily Aegis ashore, which is being developed and discussed for deployment in Romania and Poland, but Aegis ships, the procurement program is very impressive, both in numbers of platforms and the numbers of interceptors.

Here in Moscow we had a very interesting event earlier this year, a Ministry of Defense-sponsored conference on May 3-4, where our military people offered some, I think, very clear data why we think our concerns are relevant and why we think they are valid. So the best way forward to answer the specific question would be to achieve an arrangement with the United States where the reasons to be concerned are addressed, if not removed completely. If it is not possible, then we have a set of measures that was also mentioned earlier by the Russian president, more specifically in Dmitry Medvedev's statement of November 23, how to alleviate, how to remove reasons for our concerns for our own security through other means. So I think the ground is covered, so to say, and we need to work with American counterparts to ensure that something meaningful is achieved in this area.



[**SOKOVA**, *unofficial translation from Russian*]⁹ Mr. Ryabkov, thank you for your speech and for the opportunity to put some questions to you. You have mentioned that Russia, as one of the NPT depository states, believes that the 2012 Conference on establishing a WMD-free zone in the Middle East is a hugely significant event. How is the work progressing between the NPT depositories and Facilitator Laajava on organizing and holding the conference later this year? Second part of my question is about the likelihood of all the parties attending the conference – some predict that Israel and Iran will not attend. If that is the case, what do you think are the prospects for holding the conference this year, and how significant the event results will be if these two countries fail to attend?

[**A. SULTAN**]¹⁰ Let me convey my appreciation that we in Pakistan look towards Russia as an important leader in nonproliferation issues, and we appreciate the initiatives that Russia is taking in the nonproliferation field. My first question is a bit academic, it is about the relevance of the NPT under current circumstances. NPT is a very important instrument, but I think unless it is universalized by bringing in the non-NPT signatories which are nuclear-weapon states, I mean to say India and Pakistan, I think the objective of global nuclear disarmament cannot be achieved. So are there ways to integrate these two countries into mainstream nuclear regime? And we are all very clear that this cannot happen without any tangible quid pro quos. But there has to be some way to integrate these two countries into the nonproliferation regime.

Second is about the FMCT. Excellency, you mentioned this process of P5+2. As far as I know, this process is just to discuss ways and means to avoid the stalemate at the Conference on Disarmament. This is not a parallel process to negotiate FMCT. As per my understanding, all four core issues are being discussed within this club. This is not going to be any parallel initiative to discuss FMCT or negotiate FMCT. I'll be grateful if you could clarify, because through your statement maybe there could be some people could have a misperception that probably this is going to a parallel process. And we all understand, Russia, the US and Pakistan, all agree that CD is the only forum to negotiate the FMCT, there is no other forum.

Third is about the Nuclear Suppliers Group. I did not want to get into finger-pointing, but you comment about one country in South Asia, their excellent proliferation record - I just want to refer to this that NSG was created just because that country misused civil nuclear technology for weapons development. Now, the same NSG has granted exemption to the very same country. So I think these selective nonproliferation standards will not be helpful in the current environment. Thank you, Sir.

[**RYABKOV**, *unofficial translation from Russian*] Let me give you my answer to what Elena has said first. You know, coordination between the deputy foreign ministers, Ambassador Laajava and all the depositories - the co-sponsors, using the

⁹ Elena **Sokova**, Executive Director, Vienna Center for Disarmament and Non-Proliferation (VCDNP), Russian Federation/ Austria.

¹⁰ Adil **Sultan**, Deputy Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Affairs, Strategic Plans Division, Joint Staff Headquarters, Pakistan.



language of the latest NPT Review Conference Final Document – that coordination is very close. Means of communication in this day and age are vary diverse; they are not limited to personal meetings. The meetings are also taking place, and will continue to take place - but this coordination is also conducted in the form of exchanging opinions and ideas about what is going on and how we can move forward. We are very satisfied with how this is happening. As for the actual organization of the conference, this is a very complex issue, given all the difficulties that preceded the decision to conduct such a conference. Also, given the complexity of the situation in the Middle East, it is important to remember that the way the conference will be held depends on the region's countries themselves. We, the depositaries, the co-sponsors, must make every effort to give the region's countries an opportunity to attend this conference within the agreed time frame, i.e. before the end of 2012. There is absolutely no guarantee that the situation in the Middle East will become less difficult next year. There is no guarantee that some countries will change their mind regarding the merits of moving in this direction. But it is the duty of the co-sponsors and of the facilitator to put in place everything it takes for this event to happen. We continue this work in order to demonstrate to the governments of the countries in question the merits of adopting a more positive approach to this idea. We are deeply convinced that the establishment of a WMD-free zone will be to the advantage of every single country in the region.

[Speak English] On relevance of NPT and its universality - It's a never-ending story, in a sense. We can only confirm the basic proposition, which is that we do believe that India and Pakistan becoming NPT parties as non-nuclear states would be, in our view, the best option, and the best solution of many situations that are with us. I will not qualify those situations, and I am prepared to say why we think NPT is still relevant. Easier said than done.

On FMCT negotiations - I just confirm what you said, Sir, that is, this P5+1 format is a completely informal one, it's an exploratory one, and it relates to the draft work program of the conference. We are not negotiating any draft treaties on any issue at this format, and we will never do because it would be an impossibility. So the issue is about political will of any country represented at this format, as it is the case for NPT and its future.

We do think that the way forward for the whole nonproliferation system is to make the Additional Protocol universal. We do think there are several aspects of the overall discussion, many issues that relate to specific elements of the NPT, Article X problem, and so on, and so forth. We know the sentiments, we know the inclinations, we know the reasons why all this is being criticized. But no better option has been developed. The overall positive impact of the NPT for decades on international situation and international peace and security is really a tremendous one. It can never be underestimated. And we are prepared, we are committed and we are very firm in our resolve to defend and strengthen this treaty further.



[VILDANOV, *unofficial translation from Russian*]¹¹ What are the main conclusions of the analysis of the Russian inspection teams' work at the American facilities covered by the START treaty? Some 18 inspection visits are known to have been held. You will probably say that no major faults have been discovered, there are only minor irregularities. But in actual fact that is not so. To begin with, the Americans are destroying only the first stages, because they have said in the treaty that the reductions will be achieved by destroying the first stages of the ICBMs. Second, they are flagrantly violating Article XIII of the treaty, the parts or it concerning cooperation between the United States and the UK. It has become known that the United States is engaged in undeclared cooperation with the UK - this came to light only recently. I am talking about the participation of General Dynamics, an American company, in developing the missile bay of a future submarine under the Successor program. Why does Russia keep silent as it watches the United States violate the INF treaty by conducting tests of the missile defense system, for which it makes intermediate-range missiles for use as targets (they are already past the stage of short-range missiles)? This violation is evident, our chief designer Yuri Solomonov has talked about it.

[JENKINS]¹² Can you envisage, in the long term, strategic stability between Russia and the United States based on both sides replacing their strategic nuclear forces with strategic conventional weapons?

[RYABKOV, *unofficial translation from Russian*] We are watching very closely all the aspects of the situation you have mentioned and written about in your articles. That includes articles which regularly appear in the *Nezavisimoye voyennoye obozreniye* (Independent Military Review) journal and in supplements to the *Nezavisimaya gazeta* newspaper. As for the problem of compliance with the INF treaty in connection with the use of ballistic missile targets, this is not a new subject. It has always been part of our dialogue with the United States. This dialogue has not been abandoned, although it now has somewhat different formats. Speaking of the inspections you have mentioned, 18 inspection visits have been made over the year since the entry of the New START treaty into force. I can say that on the whole, our assessment is positive, although we have also made some criticisms. But these criticisms are not for public discussion – they are to be discussed in the format of the bilateral consultative commission under the treaty. Its next meeting will be held in late September in Geneva. We have a list of questions to put to our U.S. partners. I imagine they will also say to us what they believe needs to be done, based on the mutual inspection visits. There is nothing here that cannot be resolved through discussion, and there are no concerns in this area that cannot be overcome through normal, systemic, focused and responsible efforts by the two delegations. I would like to point out that these are inter-agency delegations; representatives of the Russian MoD and of the U.S. Department of Defense are heavily involved in this process. We are not neglecting or ignoring any of the aspects of the arms reductions situation, and,

¹¹ Midykhat **Vildanov**, Senior Research Associate, Military Academy of the General Staff of the Armed Forces, Russian Federation.

¹² Peter **Jenkins**, Associate Fellow, Geneva Centre for Security Policy (GCSP); former UK Ambassador and Permanent Representative to the IAEA (2001-2006), United Kingdom/ Switzerland.



I assure you, we have the most serious attitude to the issues which remain unresolved or which are not completely resolved. Solutions must be searched for at the negotiating table, not at the conference rostrum.

[*Speak English*] As for the question of distinguished Peter Jenkins - It's really something that is from the area of theoretical thinking, I would say. We have heard several ideas on the part of our American colleagues that may, in their view, bring us beyond the logic of mutual assured destruction through the possession of nuclear weapons. We do think, equally, that strategic stability in the modern world is much more than just the existence or possession of a given number of warheads and delivery means. We have a broader spectrum of both capabilities and factors to be addressed if we want to strengthen our security and the security of those who participate in this effort. To single out an issue of strategic offensive – or rather, weapons of strategic range that are conventionally armed, I think would be very wrong, because it simply rejects the validity and importance of all other aspects of this very complex problem. Besides, I am not sure I can comment on eventual future capabilities in this area even for the US, because there are several avenues for development of this type of capabilities, there are different impacts in this area that we see from, you know, scientific and political communities, over to budgetary considerations, over to industry preferences, and so on, and so forth. So it's a bit premature to talk on these issues even in a broader context, because we simply don't know what we may talk about. But it's an interesting issue.

[**HIBBS**]¹³ Our colleague Hossein Mousavian has described the Lavrov plan that you mentioned earlier as including the component of a three-month suspension of enrichment activities by Iran as part of our roadmap. And the Iranians have so far refused to suspend. They, indeed, claim that the suspension orders by the Security Council are illegal. I ask you if in your discussions with Iran, in EU3+3 process, if you are considering a way out of this dilemma to move forward without the necessity of a suspension by Iran, or if you are, on the basis of the legality, as understood by the 3+3, still insisting on a suspension by Iran for some period of time? Thank you.

[**STOUTLAND**]¹⁴ You have spoken about a number of challenging problems, including the issues in Iran, addressing the missile defense issues with the United States. But let me ask you another question. Recognizing the shared goals that we all have related to nonproliferation and countering nuclear terrorism – where are the opportunities in the near term for us to make progress, perhaps in areas where we are not sufficiently making progress? Where are the opportunities, in your view?

[**MIASNIKOV**, *unofficial translation from Russian*]¹⁵ Mr. Ryabkov, you have mentioned in your statement the inadmissibility of creating strategic offensive weapons with non-nuclear warheads. What types of weapons does Russia regard as

¹³ Mark **Hibbs**, Senior Associate, Nuclear Policy Program, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Germany/ United States.

¹⁴ Page **Stoutland**, Vice President, Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI), United States.

¹⁵ Eugene **Miasnikov**, Director, Center for Arms Control, Energy and Environmental Studies, Russian Federation.



belonging to that category, apart from non-nuclear armed ICBMs and SLBMs, and also apart from the systems now being developed by the United States under the Prompt Global Strike program? Does that category include, as far as Russia is concerned, heavy bombers of the B1-B type, which are no longer covered by the START treaty, or the long-range sea-based cruise missiles? It is known that for a long time Russia regarded nuclear-armed long-range sea-based cruise missiles as strategic weapons. Does it believe that such missiles armed with conventional warheads also constitute strategic weapons?

[**RYABKOV**] On talks with Iran: yes, the Iranians do consider UN Security Council resolutions as something that is illegal. This is very different from what is our view, of course. Therefore we cannot just review the core elements of the requirements that are put forward by the international community through these resolutions to Iran, and one of those requirements being exactly to suspend enrichment. So we try to operate within the scope of these resolutions that have been developed and adopted with active Russian involvement. But also trying at the same time to see what is realistic in this area, moving, so to say, from easier to more difficult part of the story in our proposal. Yes, there is a gap built into the Russian plan in terms of what reciprocal measures can be or should be taken by the international community if Iran does something. The idea, the whole concept is built upon the view that after Iran does something, the IAEA should verify that it's actually in place, and then counter-action comes. This is nothing new. In earlier phases of this dialogue, when it was led at that time by High Representative Solana of the European Union, the concept of statement for statement and action for action, freeze for freeze, was introduced. This is something that resembles this approach. It would be very important in our view to ensure that measures in response for some action are serious, that they are being regarded as attractive ones, otherwise there would be no reason whatsoever for the Iranian side to move into building of confidence mood. I do think that we will maintain this approach in our discussions with everyone, the only problem being that we need to do more in order not to lose momentum of these talks.

On the opportunities versus challenges in the area of nonproliferation - I think the opportunities are multiple. There is an obvious opportunity to make the arms control and nonproliferation instruments that are already in place into something truly universal. It's a huge task. It's an unfinished business everywhere. CWC is one of the topical examples. We need to do more here, and we should not overestimate, I believe, we should not overestimate difficulties that are connected with the task of making the Chemical Weapons Convention a truly global one. Secondly, we think we need finally to do something about putting into force the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, and the eight remaining countries from the so-called List of 44 should work very seriously on this issue. It's one of the lacking bricks in the otherwise quite impressive building of international arms control and disarmament. I think in the absence of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty that is in force and in place we cannot easily say that we are seriously moving forward towards full implementation of our obligations according to Article VI of the NPT. There are huge opportunities before us in the area of improvement of the IAEA safeguards system. It's not without difficulties that we are dealing with this issue, but this exactly is an opportunity.



When we have something to discuss, we need to grab this opportunity and try to find more of a common ground. Several things that relate to the reinvigoration of the Conference on Disarmament and not allowing this highly useful forum, I would almost say, to become a forum of the past – this should not happen. To use this highly useful forum to continue delivering some very important examples of concerted multilateral effort in the area of arms control - isn't it an opportunity worth mentioning here? I can go on and on and on, but, you know, those would be probably some of the major areas where we nationally will focus our efforts in the time to come.

[*Unofficial translation from Russian*] On Eugene's question: When our two countries were negotiating bilateral agreements, at various stages we arrived at different conclusions regarding the scope and parameters of the future treaties. At various historical stages there were various reasons for the inclusion or non-inclusion of specific weapons categories; there were also different counting rules for warheads mounted on delivery vehicles. This was not done to make life easier for the negotiating teams. Our military specialists were designating those weapons categories which needed to be dealt with as a matter of priority.

Any treaty is the result of a combination of various considerations. The people who negotiate those treaties – and even more importantly, those who approve them at the political level – always have the full picture, they always weigh all the ups and downs of the decisions made during the talks. It is impossible to give a satisfactory answer to the question you have asked. To begin with, you are talking about some putative future process which has not even begun. I have tried to explain in my speech that before this process can begin, we will need to complete several stages – which have not been completed yet. Second, we are assessing, on the one hand, the systems which already exist, which have continued to develop and change in terms of their purpose for several decades now. On the other hand, there are systems which are only just beginning to emerge as mock-ups or prototypes. They reach some speed, and then they stop. They fall down and crash, or they land in the wrong place. This is all very difficult. That is why I am not prepared to answer your question. But I do want to say that new strategic-range weapons systems cannot be ignored.

[**KHLOPKOV**, *unofficial translation from Russian*] With this, unfortunately, we have to conclude because we have exhausted the time allotted, and I apologize again to the colleagues who have signed up but did not have enough time to ask their questions. I thank you, Minister Ryabkov, for this frank and open discussion.

[**RYABKOV**, *unofficial translation from Russian*] Before I go, I would like to thank everyone for a very interesting and useful discussion. I learned a lot of things from this discussion, I wish you all continuation of fruitful and productive discussion, and I confirm that, where possible, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation is open, and is ready to engage in this kind of exchanges.