Good afternoon, colleagues. I am grateful to you all for the spirit of partnership and comradeship at our meeting today. I think we all just saw how just now, right before our eyes, Amb. Solanieh, representing the Islamic Republic of Iran, made an important contribution to strengthening the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty by supplying a piece of translation equipment to Dr. Zerbo. [Laughter in the audience.] It is good to see that, despite such a late hour – and I know that some colleagues had concerns about holding the meeting to discuss the CTBT so late in the day. I was actually saying the opposite when we discussed this within our own organization, I thought that dessert is supposed to be dessert, in terms of the expertise and the level of experience in this matter. I must also say that there is simply not enough space on this podium for all the experts present here, who have massive in-depth knowledge and understanding of this issue. We have with us today Amb. Berdennikov, who led the Russian delegation at the talks; we also have Viktor Slipchenko, who, if I am not mistaken, worked hard as the deputy head of the delegation at those talks.

I would like to remind you once again for those of you who was at the Russian Foreign Ministry’s Reception House yesterday – that was actually the place that hosted a number of consultations and negotiations on banning nuclear tests. These talks include those of the Partial Test Ban Treaty, and later on, in the smaller mansion by the side of the main building, diplomats held consultations on the mandate to launch the CTBT talks. That is why for us, for the experts who work at the Center for Energy and Security Studies, such places hold special significance because it is where history was made, and where it continues to be made. Of course, in every country that is actively involved in nonproliferation, there are buildings like these, which hosted similar meetings, and which continue to host numerous consultations and talks on nonproliferation and arms control.

Moving on, what are our plans for this meeting? First, I would like to give the floor to Dr. Lassina Zerbo, Executive Secretary of the CTBTO Preparatory Commission. I have already mentioned during this Conference that Dr. Zerbo was probably the first guest to confirm his attendance of this Conference. We discussed this with him here in Moscow last autumn, and he said he would come if we invite him. This consistency,
and the fact that in all our cooperation — and I’m sure in all his endeavours as well, - Dr. Zerbo is always true to his word. That deserves enormous respect.

Dr. Zerbo will deliver a keynote address as an honored guest of the Conference, on the subject we agreed to describe as “Why am optimistic about the future of the CTBT”. After his address, other participants will present their own vision of the critically important measures and steps that should be taken to ensure the treaty’s entry into force. There is no formal time limit to this session, so after we finish the CTBT discussion at 7.15pm, we will continue in the next room over tea and coffee. Dr. Zerbo, please.

[ZERBO]³ Good afternoon, and thank you, Anton, for inviting me and congratulations in putting such a remarkable gathering, where we all come to discuss freely and see how best we can find a solution to the global concerns of the moment. So, at your Center, I think, you have grown with time and became better every year. For example, you managed to bring Foreign Minister Lavrov this morning and that was, indeed, excellent. So your Center is now a world center. I was thinking this morning when I was listening to you and to others, I said ok, I saw CENESS Russia, maybe I will see CENESS Burkina-Faso. We can discuss it. But you have asked me when we were talking the day before yesterday when you said why don't you talk about your optimism for the future of the CTBT. And I said to myself, okay, what would be my answer? But I have one straight answer to that. I am optimistic for the future of the CTBT because there is no other alternative to the optimism and opportunity that the CTBT gives to any progress in non-proliferation and disarmament today.

That is why I am optimist about the CTBT’s future. That is the first thing. The second, I am optimistic about the CTBT my priorities have become clearer with each passing year since joining the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Preparatory Commission in Vienna. And that is what keeps me focused. It keeps me focused because in joining the CTBT I was fortunate to meet excellent people I think the panel here is the example. Hans Blix, a member of the Group of Eminent Persons in his 90s, but he looks 40, because he is mixed with the CTBTO Youth Group. Sig Hecker is my, well, we call each other Kazakh brothers, because we had great experience from Kazakhstan, and do not ask him why. Sha Zukang as well. I mean he has been in negotiations for so long. But if you see Ambassador Sha, whenever I see him in the panel as he looks, what I need to do is to lock you in the room because you are part of those who have made the CTBT so difficult to come into force. And he has to pay for it and I hope you’ll ask him tough and difficult questions for him to be able to give answer. But the next reason why I'm optimistic about the future of the CTBT is the youth. And then you have a young talented expert from the DPRK, you are giving us an opportunity to share the stage and then, now I thought you would share the wisdom of those who have been in this field for so long and is giving us hope. Hope, because I believe in the youth and I’m not the only one. But at least you've seen some talented CTBTO Youth Group member today. I think Asya was kind of assisting you as master of ceremony. And more than that — as a research associate. And Sarah from Monterey and then others who are now at “MEPhI” - a hundred CTBTO Youth Group

³ ZERBO Lassina, Executive Secretary, Preparatory Commission of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO)
members who are talking about the future of the CTBT, how best they can help. And I am optimistic, because those young people make the impossible possible. Why? Because young people do not have the burden of the difficulties of the negotiations and people who did not agree or agree to disagree. And then they come with fresh ideas and then for those who think the CTBT is impossible, the Youth Group members will make it possible, because they gather young talented fresh ideas to get this Treaty moving and making it the reality.

And I'm optimistic as well about the CTBT because, of course, when I come to Russia I can't lose any single space of optimism because I'm coming to a country where at the highest level, they have shown and reaffirmed their commitment to this Treaty, even at a time when there were doubts that Russia may pull out and start testing. You heard it from Foreign Minister Lavrov today, I heard it from President Putin yesterday at Valdai. But I'm more optimistic about the future of the CTBT, not only CTBT, non-proliferation and disarmament, because yesterday President Putin said the following. Answering to the question: “Is disarmament possible?” he said yes. “Is Russia committed to disarmament?” he said yes, Russia is committed to disarmament, Russia is committed to the Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty and to the START Treaty as well, that is what he said yesterday. And when you hear this, I think the more you are talking about positive note at this time when everything seems, you know, darker and darker.

But what brings my optimism is because not only listening to them, what I see, when I say there is no other alternative, many people often ask me: “what do you think about the Ban Treaty?” Of course, the Ban Treaty strives to achieve what we are all dreaming for – the world free of nuclear weapons. But this is how we can be determined to achieve a goal that is noble to all of us. But the ways to achieve that goal are very different. But one thing that bring us all together is because we know. For instance, that the CTBT is long due, and we know as Dr. Blix was telling me again a couple of days ago, that this is the simplest step that we can take to make progress in non-proliferation and disarmament. This is why I am optimistic about the CTBT. So now if I take those sources of optimism to what we have achieved for the past 20 years at the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty technically and politically. Technically today no one has doubt about the ability of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty’s verification regime in the build-up and the international monitoring system to give you and the international community the trustworthy and credible data that you can use to make your own mind with regard to events that happen on this planet. And I'm not talking only about nuclear test explosion. When there is an event, the High Representative for Disarmament was asking me, what about this little earthquake or a little quake, or event that happened a couple of weeks ago? People go to the CTBT today to ask for credible information. So that means that if the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and its international monitoring system did not exist, we would had had to create it. That is why we have to be optimistic about this Treaty and optimistic about its verification regime in the makeup.

So, I will not go into detail about what we have achieved technically, let me go to the political realm. 183 countries, I have got this to say – no and never to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, with 166 having ratified. I often say when I say this: you know, I get some hit in my nails, why do you say that 8 remaining countries hold
the Treaty as hostage? But that is that fact. Because without these 8 remaining countries, we cannot get this treaty into force. And this is why yesterday at Valdai forum I asked President Putin, because many people before me were asking questions and talking about his leadership, and I said to President Putin: with the leadership they are talking about, and with the commitment you have shown and expressed about the CTBT, how about you sharing this leadership among the P5, so that we get this Treaty unlock from the position it is today and for the past 20 years. “Yes”, the straight answer that was short. “We believe in the CTBT; we will help achieve its entry into force”. It was probably the shortest answer to all the questions that were asked yesterday. This is why I’m optimistic as well.

So politically when people say that the U.S. would never ratify. Of course, the U.S. will ratify. Why I think the U.S. will ratify? This Administration is talking about anything that contributes to U.S. national security - they are buying. Our job is to prove that the CTBT verification regime contributes to U.S. national security, this is what we have to do. And why it does? Because no other country can have the technical means to look for event in the search for nuclear test explosion than the CTBT and its international monitoring system. We complement the national technical means of every single country including the big ones. We work closely with them.

Right now, sitting, I just got an SMS about some detection that we had that we are still searching for to see how relevant they could be to give an indication of isotope that could be related to the DPRK event. This is what we serve the international community for. And this is why we contribute to those who have the means to do monitoring, to complement national technical means. So, we have to work and getting things through civil society and congressmen in the U.S. for them to understand that what was impossible in 1999 when the CTBT was hardly 10 or 15% completed, is possible today with 92% completion of the international monitoring system.

My next point is China. China is today contributing data to the international data center, and certified the first station last year in China in December after 15 years of build-up in the country. And we yet to certify five more this year to bring 6 stations contributing data to the International Data Center in Vienna. It shows progress. Progress, because 10-15 years ago the interpretation of the Treaty from China's perspective was different. And today they are giving data because they believe in the organization, they believe in this Treaty, they believe in the work we are doing. And that is optimism. So, if China and the U.S., to a certain extent, because we have to do more work there, and you are all part of it, including the panelists sitting here. When Sha Zukang tells me: Lassina, you know, if you tell me that the U.S. has ratified, China would ratify. So, I am tempted to say and let me try and make you feel that they have done it, or do fake news, so they would feel that they have done it and you can ratify before them and then they can come. That is just what type of a thing that comes to my mind, but Sha, I think you have a job for yourself, you made it difficult, so you will probably help us through this panel to make life easy to all of us. So, this is why and where I get my optimism.

I can go on and go on and go on. Yesterday at Valdai we were talking about “creative destruction”, how the current problem can bring solution in our world, and somebody said: “The problem is if you are born, you committed to die”. And I said: “No, you are
not committed to die, because you do not choose to come”. So, you know, you are not committed. And I will give you a little story. My middle daughter, when she was 12 years old, having braces was in fashion at the school. And she came and said: “Mommy, I want braces because I want to fix my teeth”. And we told her that it is expensive, because I mean you have to wait a little bit because that is not paid by social security. And then she went on in her bedroom and came back in and said: “You know, mommy, you guys have to solve this, because I did not choose to come out with teeth that are not straight. So you got to fix it, that is your problem”. Same thing here. You have not choose to have nuclear weapons on this planet. And that is why they do not want that.

The CEO of Alibaba said yesterday that the problem with youth is not us; their problem is the decisions that we make for them. So we should not make decisions for them, we should help them to make their own decisions and to prepare their own future. So we should stop making life difficult for young people. And we should bring them solution or help them to find solution to the problem they find, rather than putting in front of them problem that we have created for so long and hoping that we can solve it for them. So I will end here. And you know, probably rely on the question, because I can talk about my own optimism on the CTBT more and more, and more, and more, and more. Thank you so much.

[KHLOPKOV] Thank you, Dr. Zerbo, for your optimism, for your investment in new generation and for the work you are doing. I would now like to give the floor to our next speaker, who – like many people in this audience – needs no introduction. Hans Blix served for a long time as the Director-General of the IAEA, and before that he was the Foreign Minister of Sweden. Among his other titles, Dr. Blix, as I already mentioned, is a member of the Group of Eminent Persons assembled by the CTBTO Preparatory Commission. Dr. Blix, please.

[BLIX] Thank you very much. I think it is very hard not to be invigorated by Lassina Zerbo. He has the capacity to wake us all up. Now we talk about critical steps for the Treaty entry into force, that is the CTBT. It is easier, I think, to find a good argument why it should not be in force, but there are also some steps that we can discuss. The normal life of the Treaty is, first, its entry into force and then the entry into operation. The CTBT seems to do the opposite. It has entered into operation and its machinery is in order, but it is not in legal force. Over 186 countries have signed the Treaty, and even if they have not ratified it, their signatures bind them not to do anything that goes against the object and purpose of the Treaty. And that applies also to the 8 states, whose ratifications are needed. They are bound not to defeat the object and purpose of the Treaty. And the Security Council recognized this in its boundary resolutions. It is in line with these obligations that so far signatories, capable of testing, are maintaining a moratorium, and prudence requires indeed that they continue to respect this moratorium. Nevertheless, the world would be living less dangerously, if the CTBT was in full legal force, rather than being what former Secretary of State Kerry called a “de-facto norm”. Ratifications do add a significant legal barrier to testing. States that still withhold necessary ratifications should be more aware that they increase thereby a risk that some state one day will undertake a nuclear test. And were

---

4 BLIX Hans, Member of the CTBTO Group of Eminent Persons (GEM); Fmr. Minister of Foreign Affairs (1978-1979); Fmr. IAEA Director General (1981-1997), Sweden
that to happen, it would most likely trigger others to do the same. More tests will start a new nuclear arms race; they should be aware of that. By contrast, as the Security Council stated in 2016, an effectively verified test-ban would constrain the development and qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons and end the development of advanced new types of nuclear weapons.

And it is valuable not at least today, when there is a talk about nuclear weapons tactical character. Some nuclear weapon-states have criticized the new Ban Treaty, the Nuclear Ban Treaty, urging that nuclear arms control should be pursued by step-by-step measures. If this argument is made seriously, I think not as Lassina said, it would be easy to stop and ratify, but this would be difficult. But what they could do in a step-by-step is to ratify the CTBT. That is what I would like to refer to, it should be a long-hanging fruit, unfortunately it is not.

Today I will go from the general to the specific. Today there is an overwhelming need to induce the DPRK to cease testing nuclear weapons and missiles. Its ratification is needed to help the CTBT to come into force, and that is why I discuss it here. Ever sharper sanctions and military demonstrations have not so far had a decisive effect to persuade the DPRK to ratify the CTBT. What would bring them to that? The DPRK seems to have declared that it would be ready to denuclearize if others do so. Would it also be ready to stop nuclear testing and ratify the CTBT, if all other states, whose ratifications are needed, are ready to do the same? Would be glad to hear the reply to that. Certainly, if they did, it would help to bring the DPRK to better relations with the world community and it would reduce the risks in the world. I share the view that time is now overripe for the relevant state actors to move to serious diplomatic context to defuse an explosive situation on the Korean peninsula. That includes stopping nuclear tests. While talks now are heard, they aim to facilitate to further longer arrangements with North Korea, like a peace treaty and normal international relations, security for the whole peninsula and the area. That can hardly be the subject to discussions today, nor can be the subject of the full denuclearization that the U.S. raised, or it’s opposite - the recognition of the DPRK as a nuclear-weapon state. But there could perhaps be least crucial, but less far-reaching items on the agenda of the talks.

The view that I share that Sig Hecker and Bill Perry have talked about, would have the U.S. had, on the statements, that the U.S. does not seek the regime change, the offer that the U.S. and RoK could be ready for an open-ended suspension of variously military exercises that the DPRK perceives as threats. This could be reciprocated by readiness, on the part of the DPRK, for an open-ended suspension of all nuclear tests and at least of long-range missile tests. Reciprocal arrangement, whether manifested in parallel declarations or, otherwise and however, engineered diplomatically, could have some clear benefits and I will enumerate some of them. The threat of growing significance to the U.S. would be put off in time as testing of long-range missiles seized; no mutual confidence would be needed for the suspension of actions; the DPRK would keep the missiles and nuclear bombs with regards to its life insurance and would not doubt continue construction work, but it could not do more testing. The other side would retain all its capacities for military action for deliberately demonstrating them. If either side were to breach this commitment, the other side could do the same. New special mechanism of verification would be needed. The testing of missiles and nuclear bombs and pursuit of military exercises can be widely
observed. The longer suspensions would hold, the more confidence would grow, the more time there would be made available to explore a longer-term arrangements. And in the process, I think, the DPRK should also then consider a manifest this determination to ratify the CTBT.

[KHLOPKOV] Thank you, doctor Blix, specifically for your practical suggestions of what can be done related to the situation on the Korean peninsula, because this is one of the issues, which we will discuss in very details tomorrow afternoon, but I think it will be very useful and helpful to start part of the discussion with regard to nuclear test moratorium today. So, our next speaker, Sig Hecker, former Los Alamos Lab Director, who is with CISAC at Stanford for many years, who is known not only due to his expertise in nuclear weapons, but he was also involved in exchanges and communication with North Korean scholars and officials in the past. So, Sig, the question to you is how do you see the prospects of the CTBT ratification in the U.S.? Is it a realistic goal? And second point with regard to global nuclear test moratorium which today means Korean peninsula. Do you see any prospects how can we achieve that?

[HECKER] Thank you, Anton. Let me first start by saying it is difficult not to be optimistic when you listen to Lassina Zerbo. And particularly when it rings in the importance of the young people. However, because of the question that Anton posed, I have to come back to reality. And that is a prospect of ratification in the United States. As you know our President at that time Bill Clinton signed the CTBT 21 years ago. The Senate failed to ratify it in 1999 and we have come no closer.

We have a deep divide in the United States about the CTBT itself and the ratification of the CTBT. And the problem is that this deep divide has two sides, that are rigid. The proponents of the Treaty say that the United States does not need to test and, in fact, it has developed the science-based Stockpile Stewardship Program that more or less sided claims has computers that replace the need for testing, so we do not need to do anything, our arsenal will stay safe and reliable. They also say that verification is no longer a problem. And they also claim that the benefits of signing the CTBT would be enormous because it would get other countries not to test. That is one side. The other side, the opponents say: look, we do not believe this Stockpile Stewardship business. When you do not test, you lose a lot. And we are concerned about the safety and the reliability of the U.S. arsenal. Actually, some of them also would like to develop new nuclear weapons, but even without that they pose a serious problem. They say the non-proliferation benefits of the U.S. ratifying are not there. They say, for example, just look at now, look at North Korea, they tested, even though we have not tested. They do not think there are any benefits. My view is that neither side is right. We have not been able to formulate the arguments in a way that bridge that gap.

And so let me try to formulate those arguments because that is what I think would have to be done to get to the point. What Lassina Zerbo mentioned that perhaps the Administration will I actually think that is our advantage. I give you, as Anton said, not just the academic view, but a practitioner one, because I was there at the time President Clinton asked whether he can sign the CTBT or not. So, I was right there on

---

5 HECKER Siegfried, Senior Fellow, Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies, Stanford University; Fmr. Director of the Los Alamos National Laboratory (1986-1997), United States
the hot seat. And I signed the first two letters of certification that the Stockpile is safe and reliable to the President of the United States. This is 1996-1997, so 20 years ago. And at the time I signed, and said that our stockpile is safe and reliable without the need for nuclear testing. At this time, I added. And I was five years from when we had the last nuclear test which was September 23rd, 1992. Okay, well now we are 25 years after that date and as a matter of fact, you lose something when you do not test. Computers are great, but in the end computers have to be looked at and the outcome has to be looked at with respect to experiment. And so to say that we lose nothing - I personally do not believe that. There is some loss in confidence when you do not test.

However, we did try to set up this program of Stockpile Stewardship. And in my opinion, if this program would be done in a robust fashion, then I would see it that we can actually keep the confidence level high. But first, we have to admit that there is the loss of confidence, and you have to work hard to make sure that you have sufficient confidence. So I think that is very important. The issue of whether we benefit, the United States, let us start with United States, because I am giving you that perspective. Of course, again, it is mine, not necessarily that of the government. One has to look at what do we gain, the United States, if other countries do not test. But frankly, if we would test, it would be focused on safety and reliability. Our country has made the decision no nuclear weapons with new capabilities. So I think it is actually doable.

Besides, if you look at it, the United States has conducted 1054 nuclear tests. Russia has conducted (the Soviet Union, actually) 715. That is more or less the same. We both know a lot about nuclear weapons. From there you go down to France, as was mentioned earlier today, 217 it turns out, then you go down to the UK – 45, and here you go to China – 45, then you go to India and Pakistan – 6, and now you go to North Korea – 6. So if the U.S. and Russia go back to testing, it is mostly, in my opinion, for this issue of reliability and safety. However, I do not believe that it would upset the strategic balance, but it is not necessary. However, if China would somehow no longer feel comfortable with the fact that they have the minimum deterrent, and it would test, then you unleash a problem of, say, what will the U.S. do, what will Russia do, so they would unleash some sort of a new arms race. And it gets even worse when you get beyond China, that is India and Pakistan. So if you get to India and Pakistan, and if you think about just one nuclear test, which, of course, would be met with another nuclear test, then, all of a sudden, you have issues when India is determined to develop the triad. You know, all of three legs of deterrence. And Pakistan responses with full-spectrum deterrence. If you look their nuclear tests can make South Asia significantly more dangerous.

And then, of course, with North Korea. I think, Doctor Blix has already touched on North Korea. So from the U.S. standpoint, then I would now make the case that tests by either China, India or Pakistan make the world a much more dangerous place. So it is in our national security interest in order not to test. So I maintain that if we do Stockpile Stewardship appropriately, a robust program, we can take care of the U.S. stockpile. And then at the same time, have the benefit of making sure that the world does not go unstable by returning to nuclear testing. So the bottom line is I am greatly in favor of putting in as much of a barrier to other countries going back to nuclear
testing in order to the world remains, or as to say, becomes a more stable place. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[KHLOPKOV] Thank you, Sig. Our next speaker is Sha Zukang. Like Dr. Blix, he is also a member of the CTBTO Group of Eminent Persons. Many of you know Amb. Sha for his work as a Chinese representative at the UN office in Geneva in the early 2000s, and for his work at the UN as a Deputy Secretary-General. Amb. Sha, please.

[SHA] Thank you, Anton. Well, having listened carefully the keynote speech by Lassina, because he claims to be a very optimistic person, I must claim I am more optimistic than him, because even if the sky falls there is taller people to support it. I am short. Now, I believe that all of you must have read Ambassador Grigory Berdennikov’s paper. I treat him as well as William and Victor as my tutor. Because I when I joined this disarmament business, they taught me a lot, I learned a lot from them. You know, I am not a modest person, and when say it, I really mean it. Now that said, CTBT. I differ with certain aspects of the previous speakers. I think number one CTBT, though not in force, but as far as I see it, make no mistake, I am a retired diplomat, ok? I am a former diplomat. I do not claim to speak on behalf of my government anymore. But for me, I think the CTBT is de-facto in force.

As far as I can recollect, once former Soviet Union (or Russia), the U.S. pushed the very hard for the three junior nuclear weapon countries the UK, France and China, with particularly China in mind, for this negotiation and conclusion of the CTBT. We trusted them. We trusted the U.S. We thought that as a prime mover, they are so serious, they are so honest, and you worked so hard. It is only natural that you would certainly ratify it. My colleague mentioned of a name of the test I do not know whether they are right not because there more than 200 tests, which are not announced. So it would be more than 1200 more. So with that China, with only 45 tests but based on our own thinking, right or wrong, we thought that negotiating of the CTBT must be good and it must be ratified, was definitely into the force with prime mover like the United States or Russia. Eventually, even today, we haven’t picked the U.S. as a leader, because they have always claimed to be the leader and anything, they are not even elected, but they are leaders. Ok. Anyway, we accept that, fine, but lead by a good example. Do not lead by a bad example. We have all kinds of leaders. So we expect the U.S. to be a good leader in ratifying this Treaty. But it is fair to do it. And we do not know whom to blame, because government, administration that we interact with, they blame the senators, senators blame the scientists, because the scientists cannot give them a good answer, whether are you sure if the Stewardship Program is successful or not, and are you sure you have confidence with the computer you say, scientists cannot say: no, they are going round and round and we do not know what would happen. And they are justified that they are being honest and factual. So all we can say, the fact is that the United States has not ratified and that it is not possible for them to ratify and then what is the point? If the U.S. with that number of tests refuse to ratify, it will be extremely difficult for China to ratify. That is my view, that is not my government’s position, if you want it – ask in Beijing.

---

As an ex-chief negotiator, that is my understanding, because we had a strong sense of being cheated. My government has already sent a report after the consultations with various ministries to the National People’s Congress asking for ratification, but so far, our deputies of the National People’s Congress have not done it, because they are divided as in the U.S., as you said you are divided in the United States, in China, among the deputies, they are all divided. Some people say: we are the Communist leadership, if your government says do something - we will do it, as if there is no democracy at all, because we are called a dictatorship. So if the government says – do it, you will do it. But you want the government to do it and then you say “you have no democracy”. This is a dilemma, but I can tell you that there is always a division among Chinese deputies in the National People’s Congress.

Some people ask me: Sha, you know, you told us, as a chief negotiator, that the U.S. would definitely ratify it, because it is in their interest; Russia would certainly ratify it, because with that many tests, because their evaluation is that if they want to upgrade, modernize their nuclear weapons, perhaps they need another 1,000 tests. That is why they took the political decision in order to ensure that superiority by the two over the rest of the three. That is my argument. Right of wrong. And they believed me. So therefore, now back to the issue whether China will ratify it or won’t it. I told Lassina jokingly that China will certainly not become an obstacle for ratification of this Treaty. I claim that China behaves as if we have ratified. Lassina, Chinese dedication as I understand, you witnessed, we participated in all the activities organized by your Secretariat. And this is the answer I think you need to know but I hope I am wrong, I hope that China will ratify before the United States, because the CTBT is very dear to me, and even personally I say that the CTBT, I spend so many years on that, without any holiday, because the U.S. Ambassador or my good friend Grigory, you know, you kept us all busy, we worked day and night, without any holidays. And we had a lot of pleasure from the inside.

Ok, now this is about China’s ratification, and I wish I was wrong, but we will see after the conclusion of the 19th Party Congress whether there will be any change of the policy. This is number one. Number two, another point. I think regarding the ratification I would say that there are 3 groups of countries. We need 44 ratifications for the Treaty to enter into force. And 44, all of them, are equally important, because any one of them does not ratify that, then the Treaty cannot enter into force. That is my understanding. That is what the Treaty says. But among the 44, particularly among the 8, they are different. And I think China, P5, nuclear five, has special responsibilities. And among the P5 Russia has set examples, the UK and France have done the job, and we admire them, I hope China could have done the same, but as we underlined the reasons why China is a bit late, but we will try to do it. So China, P5, must take the lead. That is sort of a moral obligation. And I hope my government will take the issue seriously after this Party Congress.

Now, since I said each one of 44 is equally important, then perhaps we have to look at other issues like Ambassador Berdennikov mentioned yesterday in the framework of the NPT Review Conference, he outlined 4 issues. I fully agree with him. This WMD in the Middle East is one, and relationship between the Ban Treaty and the NPT. I really sympathize fully agree with the banning. Nuclear weapons should be banned. If we have banned chemical weapons, if we banned biological weapons, why not
banning nuclear weapons? There is no reason. They are more dangerous, more indiscriminate. So it is more inhuman in a way and we should ban it. So for that reason I personally fully agree in behind with all those who pushed forward the Ban Treaty. But we must look at the reality. You cannot drag your eye, your hair and take it off from the Earth. We must make sure that your feet is solid on the ground. So with this treaty, the Ban Treaty, is fine an objective, fine intentions. But I do not think it will succeed. I am not saying that it is doomed to die, but let me say 10 years later, 20 years later resume, I hope I am still alive by that time, with that Treaty in force and without participation of nuclear weapon-states and those protected by nuclear umbrella, what are you going to do? This is a serious issue.

So, nuclear disarmament can only be done step by step. That is not something we like, but it will develop that way. Test Ban Treaty is historically the most important treaty towards nuclear disarmament. So I am sorry for being too long, but do not underestimate the CTBT. I hope the relationship between the Ban Treaty, ban is good, but not realistic. They have lifted the rock and eventually it may drop on their own feet, because they have to solve the problem they created themselves. Nobody can convince the U.S. or anyone else to ratify this Ban Treaty. To be honest, I am not talking like a diplomat, because I have retired, I am talking like a former one. Ok. Let us be honest to ourselves, I need a propaganda of course, as long as it self the purpose.

I think we need to choose. And so, with that word I wish you good success, Lassina, let us all work on the ratification of the Treaty and it is something we have no choice. Thank you very much.

[KHLOPKOV] Thank you, Ambassador. Thank you for your optimism. Our final speaker at this session is Jong Nam Hyok of the DPRK Foreign Ministry’s Institute for American Studies. I think he is now in a somewhat difficult situation because the DPRK is currently the only nation that continues to conduct nuclear weapons tests, and so we are all the more grateful to you, Mr. Jong, for being with us here today. Thank you. The floor is yours.

[JONG] So, I am happy to sit aside to famous people here. Maybe I am the youngest speaker at this session, and I am the last speaker of the today’s session. So in that sense my special thanks, once again, go to my Russian friend, Anton. So it has been so long time since the CTBT was made in 1996. And recently some countries and some international organizations like CTBTO Preparatory Commission has condemned and criticized the DPRK’s nuclear tests, as you all here know. And they are asking us to join the CTBT. First of all, I would like to highlight that whether a country enters a multilateral treaty or not, totally belongs to its sovereign right. The CTBT has been effective yet. There are few people criticize those countries, who did hundreds of nuclear tests, but there is a lot of criticism tightening my country. I think this is unfair and it is a clear double standard. The DPRK is now building up its nuclear forces in tandem with its economic development in order to defend its sovereignty, political system and its people from the U.S. nuclear threat lasted for six decades. Of course, the United States always said that the U.S. has no hostile intentions towards North Korea, but I think it is unbelievable. Donald Trump carries the nuclear football which controls the launch of thousands of nukes that can make

7 JONG Nam Hyok, Research Associate, Institute for American Studies (IFAS), Ministry of Foreign Affairs, DPRK
this current world disappear. Such man has recently said at the UN General Assembly podium that he will totally destroy the DPRK. The U.S. nuclear triad, the three legs of the U.S. nuclear force, are always targeting the DPRK. The U.S. strategic force tested Minuteman III launch this year for several times, and as you know, the three types of strategic bombers are constantly staying in Guam and they are flying to the Korean peninsula weekly recently. And also now currently the nuclear-propelled submarine is now at South Korea.

Facing this dire situation, the DPRK can be assured once again that nuclear arms development policy is a right choice and at the same time, building up its determination to continue nuclear and ballistic missile-related tests to end a severe nuclear threat from the United States. These tests are in a true sense serve defense-oriented and they are not against the principles of international relationship. And that is why the tests must not be target of criticism. The United States, the biggest nuclear power in the world is giving a severe nuclear threat to the countries, who do not obey their intention. These threats must be criminalized.

The United States signed the CTBT in 1990s as you all know here, but has refused to ratify it. As you know, Barack Obama initiated building a nuclear weapons-free world, and thanks to this initiative, he got Nobel Peace Prize, but in the backstage, he hatched up the modernization of nukes to maintain the nuclear supremacy over other countries. And he made a plan to spend 100 billion dollars in the next 20 years. So that is why even the New York Times article called Barack Obama an “Anti Anti-Nuke President”. Today Donald Trump does not hesitate to openly emphasize the expansion, the modernization of his nuclear arsenal. As several nuclear powers, including the United States, has not entered or has not ratified the CTBT and all of them are strengthening their nuclear forces and the DPRK is facing serious nuclear blackmail from the United States, so the DPRK’s entrance to the CTBT is undebatable. The DPRK’s nuclear development is an unavoidable choice to respond the hostile policy of the United States. Due to that reason, my country is strengthening its nuclear forces in spite of everlasting political, military, economic hostile reaction of the United States. But the DPRK is firmly committed to its non-proliferation obligations as a responsible nuclear state. The situation in Northeast Asia is currently very complicated, very dire and severe, but the DPRK will safeguard peace in the region depending on its own physical strength. Thank you very much.

[KHLOPKOV] Thank you, Mr. Jong, for your clear statement. Now have 15 minutes to discuss related issues here, but then we will continue but informally, but first whom I would like to give the floor to, my boss, during this session, Dr. Zerbo. Doctor, if you have any questions to other speakers and participants, you are very much welcome. I would like to ask my two questions. First to doctor Jong. I think it was January 2015, when the DPRK Foreign Ministry introduced the initiative “Nuclear test moratorium in return for moratorium for the joint RoK – U.S. exercises in the region”. Later it was reintroduced in a slightly different way by China, and recently as a joint proposal by China and the Russian Federation. So how you see the status of that initiative in Pyongyang? Is it still on the table, how you see it? This is first. Sig, with regard to the U.S., prospects of the CTBT ratification in the U.S., I have discussed a number of issues, what the prospects are when I was in Washington, and sometimes the answer was: we do not feel any pressure. We do not feel that. This is a
challenge, a threat to our national security regarding the current status of the Treaty. So my question to you will it be a game changer if China or Russia will have a nuclear test? Because it looks like something dramatic should happen to change minds of people in Washington. Will it help or it will incentivize Americans to test as well? This is a question for Sig. Ambassador, not for you. Doctor Zerbo, do you have any questions to other participants?

[ZERBO] First of all to Sig. I think my question goes along with what you have just said. When Dr. Hecker mentioned that any further test in the United States will only be for reliability, and that it is not for more new nukes. Ok. How do you explain this to a layman in the developing world, those who are today pushing the competition modelling into the CTBT, whereby that is not our call. They want to know if others are doing modelling, why do you want us to join the CTBT? Why do you believe on the CTBT? You say it is only for reliability of Stockpile Stewardship. So what message you can give to those guys, in developing world with regard to what the U.S. is doing that you say it is not for developing nuclear weapons, but only for reliability of the existing one as long as nuclear weapons exist? That is my first question.

My comment to what Ambassador Sha Zukang said about even what also Sig Hecker mentioned, about an optimism that probably goes beyond what is practical. I want to quote, you know, Bob Carlin who was here. He talked about optimism and pragmatism. I would say mine is probably pragmatic optimism. I do not lose sight of the reality. I know and I see the facts. But I think that if we continue being so pessimistic about the possibility of getting the CTBT ratified by one of the key countries, as Ambassador Sha said, among the P5, what hope do we give to others with regard to non-proliferation in general and, ultimately, disarmament? So if we believe that disarmament is possible, we have to get this Treaty in force by all means, because as Dr. Blix said it is “a low-hanging fruit”. Not that is easy, but it is probably the simplest we can do now to give hope to people in the field of non-proliferation and disarmament.

To a young expert from the DPRK. I thank you for your straight comments and what you have said. But I want you to share the position of international organizations, like the CTBT. And my job, it is what I am paid for, is to put technical and political means for the entering into force of the Treaty that bans all nuclear test explosions. After being forgiven, because I am paid for something that if I do not do it, they’ll stop paying me. If I do not do my best to talk about how we can prevent nuclear test explosion and how we can stop it without getting into domestic policy of the countries. I am talking about the fact, because I have the international monitoring system that detect and then given the information to the international community. That is the job we have been trying to do on the CTBT to provide countries with the means to see that the Treaty is verifiable. Today it is.

My last point is on the Ban Treaty. I agree with Sha. We talk about being practical now, yes, it is the Ban Treaty should carry the CTBT along to get the CTBT ratified. And I often give a little story about that which is a toddler. In Africa and my brother Doc from South Africa would say: a very few babies move from sitting to walking without crawling. Ok? When we do that we force them to crawl, because if we walk without crawling we will never have solid legs. So this is how I put the CTBT. If you
get the Ban Treaty without international measure like the CTBT, it might not be sustainable. That is why it is so important to get the CTBT in force. And as the arms control treaties that are pending as we move towards the world free from nuclear weapons. Thank you.

[KHLOPKOV] Thank you, Dr. Zerbo. I have three experts who would like to raise questions, four. We will collect all questions and then we will give the floor to the speakers to respond. General Esin first, then Senator Kamran after. Can you pass the microphone here please? Col. Gen. Yesin.

[ESIN] Thank you. I have a question to esteemed Dr. Zerbo. As we all know, on September 3, North Korea detonated its most powerful nuclear explosive device to date, and said it was a test of a thermonuclear device. What is your own assessment of the type of the device detonated on September 3? What is the assessment produced by your International Monitoring System? Thank you in advance for your answer.


[KAMRAN] First of all I would like to compliment the panel. And I would like to reflect on what Ambassador Sha has said about beginning to talk, and I fully agree to that, as Lassina said that we should start crawling. So Pakistan was not the first to test. And we have been observing the unilateral moratorium since then. And we have offered the bilateral moratorium to India. So there are security concerns and we are ready to crawl. We have taken the first positive step. We are waiting for a positive response. So unless we have the uniform policies for everyone, we cannot achieve the real goals. So it is very important that these community policies should end and there should be uniform policies for everyone and otherwise you will see that without signing the CTBT even NSG membership was given, otherwise NSG, all 48 members are signatories to the CTBT. But we have seen in the case of the NPT being compromised, and this is a concern in Pakistan.


[BUNN] So I want to offer somewhat a radical thought born out of frustration with the politics in my own country. It has been 21 years now since the CTBT was open for signature and we still do not see any clear pathway of the Treaty entering into force. What if a group of countries friendly to the CTBT put together a new Treaty, that was identical in all respects, except entering into force provision, and perhaps we could then get a CTBT which would actually enter into force? Is that a bridge too far?

[KHLOPKOV] Сергей Борисович.

---

8 **ESIN** Victor, Col.-Gen. (ret.), Leading Research Associate, Institute for the U.S. and Canadian Studies, Russian Academy of Sciences (RAS); Fmr. Chief of Staff and Vice Commander–in–Chief, Russian Strategic Rocket Forces (RVSN, 1994–1996), Russian Federation

9 **KAMRAN** Sehar, Senator; President, Centre for Pakistan and Gulf Studies (CPGS), Pakistan

10 **BUNN** Matthew, Professor of Practice, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, United States
Well, thank you. I am tempted to make a quick reaction to this proposal for a new CTBT without any Annex 2, like nuclear test ban. But would not go into that perhaps trying to be a little bit more serious and even more provoking. We had a very interesting discussion already starting this morning about different aspects of situation in Northeast Asia, strategic situation. And I want to say that I became more optimistic after listening to that discussion in the sense that not everything is closed, not everything is frozen that there are certain possibilities on discussion also on the side of the DPRK. Of course, with certain conditions, yes. So we need to explore that. And I also do understand very well the position of the DPRK, which is not going to do something just out of pressure and for nothing. I think the DPRK needs to see maybe on the other side is happening. But that said, maybe the DPRK can be prepared to take certain steps, which send message, but which do not yet foreclose the options that it has in terms of prior things. Now here comes my provocative suggestion.

Just a thought to think about based on two considerations. Maybe three considerations. Number one. Certain options are not closed for discussion. Number two. It would be stupid to ask from the DPRK to take unilateral measures that would really foreclose further options for the DPRK. But maybe, the DPRK in an exploratory way, as a kind of a shock, because we are also in a situation, when you need to start thinking to certain shocks. Why cannot the DPRK invite Lassina Zerbo to make, well, an event, not to make you sign the convention, the Nuclear Test Ban, you probably will not do that and maybe he will not ask that, even if he is paid exactly for that. But just to invite to talk to people. And I think it would send some shock waves, which would also be beneficial from the point of view of your national security. Of course, if he agrees to come, but he is an optimistic realist, he might. Thank you.

Thank you, Ambassador Batsanov. We do not have time for any new questions during that session, but we will have plenty of time during the reception. Now we will give one minute to each speaker, to each panelist, starting from Mr. Jong. Please.

Thank you, Anton. As for your question. There is a roadmap that proposed by China and Russia. Respected Supreme Leader Kim Jong-un recently clarified that our DPRK’s nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles are off the table as far as the U.S. hostile policy towards the DPRK continues. It is very clear, so there will be no negotiations concerning our nuclear weapons or our ballistic missiles. It will not happen. Besides, I would like to remind you, and all of you here, that the U.S. Ambassador to the UN Nikki Haley said at the UN Security Council meeting that the roadmap proposed by China and Russia is insulting to the United States. And again, in our perspective, my country is suffering from the greatest and gravest nuclear threat in the world. The United States has, I think to my knowledge, has about 7,000 nuclear warheads. Maybe 4,000 can be active in time. That kind of a nuclear power is

---

11 BATSANOV Sergey, Director (Geneva Office) and Member of the Board, Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs; Fmr. Soviet Union and Russian Federation Ambassador to the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva (1989–1993), Russian Federation
targeting us and pursuing nuclear blackmail and hostile policy for six decades. So, again, our nuclear and ballistic missiles are off the table. Thank you.

[KHLOPKOV] Thank you. Dr. Blix, please.

[BLIX] We are all agreed that it would be desirable if we get the Test Ban Treaty into force by the required numbers of ratifications. However, I think you should be aware you are not all international lawyers. International legal rules can be created in two ways: one is through treaty and then if you have a sufficient number of ratifications and then it enters into force and becomes legally binding for everybody. And you also have international legal rules coming into being by becoming customary international law, a much slower process through practice of states. And I remind you that in 1925 Geneva Protocol that after the First World War outlawed the use of chemical weapons and biological weapons, that was not ratified by the United States until three decades afterwards, gradually that norm that was laid down in that Protocol became more and more convincing. And in 1970s it was taken to become a customary international law.

And now when chemical weapons were used in Syria, everybody was convinced that it is banned even in civil wars. So it seems to me that a test ban, ban on test is on that way. That is precisely what Secretary Kerry said, it is “de-facto” norm. And we have not tested recently, but take the non-use of the nuclear weapons. We have not used any nuclear weapons since 1945. So this is even a longer period. Even here we can see that the growth of a norm coming, and I think the ban treaty adds a bit to that norm. The moratorium is a part of this, and I think there is a hope with respect for it. Even though they have not ratified it. Ratification is the best, certainly, we should strive for it, but there is clearly a good a hope anyway.

[KHLOPKOV] Sig.

[HECKER] What a pity that it is just getting interesting and this is coming to an end. So just real quickly that in Washington you get the word that they do not feel any pressure. And I think that is true, but just look at why. The U.S. has gotten itself into so much trouble in last couple of years, that this issue of ratification pales in comparison to all other issues on the table.

[KHLOPKOV] But it was the same even before that! It was not such a priority in non-proliferation in general.

[HECKER] We have been out of trouble for some time. With the fact that if Russia and China would test if it gets the attention. The answer is absolutely yes. Since we do not have time to explain, I gave that problem to my students at Stanford and say: here is Russia decided to do three nuclear tests. And I explained why. And then I actually added, it said that after it does three nuclear tests within the next six months and it will rejoin the ban. And what are you now in the U.S. government are going to do about it? And then it was exciting. The issue of reliability. How we can explain the tests for reliability? You cannot here. I mean it is my view, that it is what is needed. We could not explain it to the public, this is reliability rather than new weapons. We could not even explain that to American public, we certainly could not explain it to the rest of the world. And therefore, actually, we cannot test. And so we have to understand that the benefits of not testing and ratification outweigh the problems that
we might have in other ways trying to solve this problem that we are not doing all the things I would like to do. But that is the issue.

[KHLOPKOV] Ambassador Sha next, then, Doctor Zerbo, it will be your turn. Ambassador, please.

[SHA] Well, personally I think, my neighbor, I apologize for my poor English, but from your presentation you said something that the computer testing in the U.S. is fine, you do not need to worry, it is only to ensure that the stockpile is safe. But what really more dangerous is if China, Pakistan, India, later on Russia, all began to explode and to have testing, it would be more dangerous. Ok. Ratification, no ratification in the U.S. is nothing, but any further possible testing by China or Pakistan, or India, Russia that would be more dangerous! So whatever you do is right. And you can exercise your imagination if we are going to test. It is really dangerous.

Let me remind you, my friend, the P5 made a categorical announcement that we will not test before the entry to force of the Treaty. That why there is a moratorium. That is why I said that the CTBT is “de facto in force”, at the time there is no testing except South Asia nuclear testing or Korean testing. It was meant for the five to stop testing. But if the five made a categorical commitment – no testing anymore before the entry into force. That is why I said “de-facto”. Number one. Do not you spread this rumor anymore, ok? If China will test or not. Do not worry, we will not test at all! Full stop before the entry into force.

You asked me what kind of hope China could give to the world. This is the hope. China will not test before it entering to force. And at the same time it is not fair for me to encourage others ratify, because China itself has not ratified. But if you do, I congratulate you. Okay. And I do not want to comment on the DPRK, it is so sensitive. But let me say and emphasize the point, underlined by my good friend, my tutor, Berdennikov. Korea issue – is a security issue. It is not an issue of joining the Ban Treaty. It is security and unless the legitimate concern of the DPRK is addressed, otherwise nothing will happen, including the DPRK accession to the CTBT. I am not saying that the DPRK will not do it. But this is my point of view.

Last, but not least, the intervention of my Pakistani colleague reminds me, in fact, of our meeting among the P5 on the Security Council Resolution 1172 adopted by the UN Security Council, in which in the P5 joint statement of the P5 Foreign Ministers and that relevant Security Council Resolution, which I think we made huge contributions, which made very clear that Pakistan conducted tests after India. Okay. It is in black and white. It is fair to say, because when China is asked: what should we do about Pakistan? You know, put China in extremely difficult position. We did not say anything. You know, China is a party to the NPT. We cannot ask Pakistan to go ahead, say do not do it. It is your sovereign right! You are not a party to the NPT, but China is. What we said is that we are for non-proliferation. That is your decision. Thank you very much.

[KHLOPKOV] Thank you, Ambassador. Doctor Zerbo, I understand the sensitivity of the question you are asked, but we are in Moscow, in the Russian culture if a General asks, you must answer. [Audience is laughing]
Ok, the General asked and I must answer. But the answer to the question about what test it was, I think Dr. Sig Hecker is a better expert in the field of nuclear energy and nuclear technology than I am. I am a head of the organization that takes complexity of remote monitoring and does not go into detail of how and what is exactly the test. So I think I will leave this to Dr. Sig Hecker, so maybe, at some point, informally, you can talk about it. However, the good thing is that Sig Hecker is an expert. He said today to you all is that if you do not test, you lose something. That is a notion that we fail to explain to people. People will tell us, some do not need testing anyway, so why do you bother about the CTBT? He is an expert, who has been the director of Los Alamos Laboratory, who said, that in the long run if you do not test, you definitely lose. So that reinforces the position of the CTBT with regard to vertical and horizontal proliferation. So that is excellent to us that it is coming from you, I hope this is well-recorded and that will go as far as possible for people to know why the CTBT is important. And that pushes to why that is so important to ratify this Treaty and how it can contribute to non-proliferation ultimately and disarmament.

I am coming back to what Anton said about maybe we need something dramatic before we can move on the CTBT. I am sure he is referring to what happened in Syria before the whole international community jumped and said: ok, we have to get the chemical weapons convention by Syria and then solve everything. But the problem is something dramatic in the nuclear field would be fatal. And not all will be here to solve it. That is the problem. And that is why we have to do our best so it does not happen. What we have to do is to make sure that everyone understands that nuclear war or nuclear detonation or nuclear whatever is off the path. This 21st century cannot sustain a nuclear war, because we have seen the consequences and that is why we are here to contribute the best possible that we find peaceful, political, diplomatic solution of the science-based organization that I am feeding the international community, international agreements and treaties.

And that leads me to coming back to my optimism, which is the EU and Federica Mogherini. She is the leader in multilateral diplomacy, who speaks out and then talks about how and why she thinks the international agreements are important and how we should make them sustainable. And she does not shy away from mentioning the importance of the CTBT and then from linking it as well to other global issues. And that is what we need today. We cannot continue stovepiping issue, this is here, this is not there, this does not concern me. If we do that, nothing will concern anybody and we will solve nothing. Coming to a context of global context. From what I have heard from everybody, including our friend from the DPRK, is that what we need is everyone’s security. Everyone wants to feel secure. People do not want to feel threatened. But that is what we are here for. That is why we have treaties. And that is why diplomacy exists. And that is why multilateral diplomacy exists. People tell me: do you think it is possible? The solution is possible. I say, in diplomacy nothing is impossible. And that is why we have you guys, that is why you are all here. So we have to work together to find a solution in not only in the Korean peninsula, but for our own stability internationally and the security of our planet.

As for the lady from Pakistan, I see your point. Pakistan has come forward to be an observer to the CTBT, a practical and a participating observer. And this is appreciated, because our job is to not exclude any country. Our job is to bring
countries to join the CTBT the best way possible. And you come, you have made an important step forward by being an observer. We hope that this observership and your participation will lead to more to come. So that we create as you say, the necessary conditions in your region for that region to be fully compliant with the CTBT. Not only politically, but technically by the build-up the station to be effective in that region. So I thank you and congratulate you for that step that you have made and for the opening you are giving to this treaty by your youth. You will be surprised that we have more Youth Group members from India and Pakistan in the CTBTO than anyone can imagine. And why? Because those do not have the baggage of negotiations, the baggage of the notion of perception of discriminating factor. Maybe they have, but because they want to make impossible possible, they want to believe that the CTBT does contribute to international security and they want to work for it. Those are the people who will make the difference for India, Pakistan, for the eight remaining countries. And that does lead not me to saying that the Treaty is long due, but because anything could happen, we might be surprised. Sometimes people joke and say: Lassina, if you have three minutes ride with President Trump over the Trump Tower, what would you tell him? I wish he would give me that opportunity, maybe we will come up with the solution that would bring the U.S. ratification. Thank you.

[KHLOPKOV] Thank you, Dr. Zerbo. I thank all the five speakers of that panel. It was the last session of this day, but I have two good news for all participants. First, the reception is ready. Food and drinks should be waiting for us. It is in the conference room Kuskovsky-Marfinsky, the one where we will have sessions tomorrow and where until recently media had a media center. It was already converted into a reception place. And I would like to remind our good colleagues and friends among journalists that this is a private party, we were honoured to have you with us during the whole day, now it is time to leave participants with no media coverage. And I would appreciate if you respect that and not only avoid trying to get into the room, but leave this floor. Just let people get some rest, because some of you were quite active and more than active during this day. And another good news that our break before the next session is not too long. We start at 8 in the morning. So we start at 8 in the morning at the conference room called Kuskovsky-Marfinsky. All of you invited. The first session we will have which is called “Early Morning Coffee with “nuclear” generals and the Chair” and you are very much welcome and invited. Coffee will be served. And at 9 o’clock the session on the JCPOA will start high-level panel with deputy foreign minister Ryabkov, deputy foreign minister Araghchi, with Ambassador Sherman, with Helga Schmid, who is coming, who is on her way, with Cornel Feruta. Thank you for being with us this whole very long day. Please enjoy the reception and have a good evening.