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«Reducing Tensions on the Korean Peninsula: Possible Steps and the Role of Multilateral Diplomacy»¹

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[KHLOPKOV]² Я рад, что несмотря на то, что это наше завершающее заседание, заключительное, у нас практически полный зал. Вижу, что все в хорошем настроении, что говорит, наверное, о том, что у собравшихся все еще много идей, что делать на Корейском полуострове. Тем не менее, мы продолжаем. Я думаю, что многие согласятся со мной в этом зале, что ситуация на Корейском полуострове развивается драматически. Динамика крайне негативная. Целый ряд участников конференции в своих выступлениях, в своих комментариях уже отмечали, что время поиска решения уже уходит; ситуация развивается по крайне негативному сценарию. Поэтому, исходя из того, что это заседание, в первую очередь, надо посвятить тому, что делать.

Я думаю, что время в рамках конференции обсудить причины той ситуации, в которой мы оказались, уже было, было отдельное заседание по вызовам, рискам в регионе, было уже отдельное заседание по санкциям, был целый ряд других заседаний. Сейчас предлагаю всем, и нашим панелистам, и участникам из зала, сконцентрироваться на возможных идеях, что делать. Поскольку я, как уже упомянул, разделяю озабоченности многих выступающих, что ситуация развивается крайне драматично, еще раз хотел бы призвать участников не заужать те трудности, те проблемы, с которыми мы сталкиваемся, не ограничиваться только ракетно-ядерным потенциалом, над которым в КНДР работают.

Самый простой вариант, но на мой взгляд, самый нереалистичный с точки зрения практического выполнения, призвать КНДР прямо сейчас денуклиализироваться. С точки зрения красоты заявлений, с точки зрения получения поддержки, публичной, экспертной, очевидно, что такой подход получит одобрение и поддержку. Однако давайте исходить из реалий. На мой взгляд, главная задача в настоящее время – снижение напряженности в регионе, поскольку мы все ближе и ближе подходим к ситуации, когда конфликт политический, дипломатический может перерасти в конфликт вооруженный. На мой взгляд, время сделать шаг назад, а дальше кропотливо, но в разумные сроки работать над дальнейшими шагами, которые помогут нам вот от этой очень

¹ Recording of the session was decoded by Nadezhda MASLENNIKOVA, Intern, CENESS; and Anastasia SHAVROVA, Research Associate, CENESS.

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опасной грани, очень опасной черты отойти. В рамках нашего заседания у нас 4 панелиста, два комментатора, которые будут выступать с трибуны. Первым выступает посол по особым поручениям Министерства иностранных дел Российской Федерации Олег Николаевич Бурмистров. Посол Бурмистров, пожалуйста.

[BURMISTROV]³ Спасибо большое. Для меня огромная честь находиться в этом зале среди замечательных экспертов, которые занимаются проблемами Корейского полуострова многие годы. Мне, наверное, несколько труднее выступать, потому что я являюсь бюрократом, чиновником, и тем не менее, я также попытаюсь высказать свое мнение, в том числе личное, экспертное мнение по поводу происходящего в регионе. Антон в двухминутном выступлении совершенно правильно описал ситуацию, то, как ей нужно сейчас заниматься. Конфликт на полуострове и напряженность длятся десятилетиями, уходят корнями глубоко в прошлое. И сейчас, как Антон совершенно справедливо сказал, достигли беспрецедентного уровня. И мы каждый раз ждем, кажется, что ситуация уже подошла к предельной черте, но, оказывается, что она может обостряться и дальше. То есть, спираль напряженности постоянно нарастает.

Мы были свидетелями весеннего кризиса этого года, когда были крупные учения в регионе. Вы помните, и испытания северокорейских ракет проходили практически в еженедельном режиме и нам казалось, что дальше не может быть хуже, дальше уже война. Тем не менее, и в августе, и сейчас мы наблюдаем все более острую ситуацию. Кажется, что еще может такое произойти, кроме как дипломатического тупика и военного сценария. Будем надеяться, что до войны дело не дойдет, и не просто надеяться, а предпринимать самые активные усилия и, собственно говоря, ни одна сторона против этого не возражает, против того, что альтернативы мирному дипломатическому решению проблемы все равно нет и быть не может. У разных сторон есть разные подходы, нюансы в подходах, но в этом-то, мне кажется, согласны все. Военного сценария нет, хотя и раздаются голоса, допускающие такой сценарий, но мне кажется, что те, кто это говорит и допускает возможность военного сценария, это та сторона, против которой мы должны, все страны, все эксперты должны встать категорически против.

Таким образом, конфликт на полуострове, в определенной степени носит не межгосударственный характер, хотя формально, на поверхности, это так. Хотя существо проблемы, как правильно ее Антон описал, возможность возникновения войны лежит не между государствами, а внутри одного государства, из которого, собственно говоря, доносятся такие призывы. Из уважаемого государства, в котором существуют, как в любом демократическом государстве разные мнения, но вот разделение в позициях сторон на данном этапе, как мне кажется, должно быть простым: вы за войну или за мир? Если вы за войну, тогда вот отойдите в сторону и занимайтесь войной. Если вы за мир – тогда мы вместе. Все страны, без исключения, и Соединенные Штаты Америки, и КНДР, и Япония, и Южная Корея, и Россия, и Китай, то есть участники

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шестистороннего переговорного процесса, и все международное сообщество, и Совет Безопасности ООН и т.д. все мы должны занимать единую позицию, то есть поиск политико-дипломатического решения, на это должны быть направлены все наши усилия. И никто против этого не возражает. Уверен, что ни в этом зале, ни в медийном пространстве не найдется людей, которые всерьез могут говорить о военном решении проблем полуострова. Конечно, ситуация доведена до предела, нервы на пределе у противостоящих сторон. Много раздается заявлений на высшем уровне, которые, действительно, загоняют ситуацию в тупик и не позволяют начать разговор, начать диалог с самых простых вещей. Это моя интерлюдия, так сказать, моя оценка, как мы должны заниматься решением проблемы.

Я не хочу отнимать время и повторять официальную позицию нашего государства. И Президент Путин, и Министр иностранных дел Лавров много и подробно об этом говорят. Эта тема присутствует и на уровне МИДа, и на наших переговорах с партнерами по всему миру. В тройке тем с любым международным партнером корейская проблема стоит твердо. Сейчас это действительно мировая проблема номер один. Или номер два, но в первой тройке она точно есть. По остроте – точно номер один. Весь мир заинтересован в вовлечении. Сейчас мы видим конструктивное вовлечение тех игроков, которые раньше не проявляли большого внимания к региону. Европейский союз сейчас активно проявляет себя, и лидер ЕС, так скажем, Германия, старается найти свою роль в поиске решения. Мы, конечно же, это приветствуем. Все-таки мы верим, что будут переговоры, и что рано или поздно будет создана система региональной безопасности в Северо-Восточной Азии. И тот шестисторонний формат, который формально сейчас перестал существовать, он оптимален для будущей структуры безопасности в регионе, потому что в нем участвуют главным образом региональные участники-державы. Собственно, это дело региональных держав решать вопросы этого региона.

[KHLOPKOV] Извините, у нас по регламенту одна минута осталось. Расскажите, что делать.

[BURMISTROV] Да, извините, я заговорился. Итак, что делать. Так как мне нужно уложиться в минуту, то я хочу продать быстро участникам наш российский план, который носит несколько названий, о котором вы все слышали, это российско-китайская дорожная карта. Не буду повторять ее содержание, многие с ней знакомы. Просто мы считаем, что другого пути нет. Плод мучений и страданий наших китайских партнеров, наш вклад российский. Если вспомнить, то идея «двойного замораживания» не российская и не китайская, а нынешнего лидера Северной Кореи, который предложил ее, как многие помнят, два года назад, когда она не получила развития, многие ее проигнорировали, забыли. Но идея эта – северокорейская, достаточно свежая.

Видите, как сейчас быстро развиваются события? То, что было 1,5-2 года назад крепко забывается. Мы хотим восстановить это доверие. Оно должно восстанавливаться через взаимную военную сдержанность – через прекращение маневров, через прекращение испытаний ядерных ракет в ответ. То есть тишина на военном поле. Вот с этого нужно начать, причем гибко. Не обязательно



прекратить, не обязательно требовать – это должно быть добровольное решение каждой из сторон. Это должно быть тихое решение – не обязательно о нем громко заявлять. Просто успокоиться. Взаимное сдерживание как единственное условие для начала диалога. Никакие другие предварительные условия не помогут. Только выдвижение, как правильно Антон сказал, денуклеаризации на первое место, погубит диалог в самом зачатке. Это первый этап. Начало диалога между Вашингтоном и Пхеньяном. В любой форме – тихой, громкой, публичной, непубличной.

Дальше – выработка и фиксация принципов взаимоотношений: ненападение, мирное сосуществование. Можно подписать, можно продекларировать. Договориться о принципах нормализации отношений между Северной Кореей и Вашингтоном, между Северной Кореей и Сеулом. С Сеулом совершенно особая повестка – это две Кореи. Не надо туда вмешиваться, пусть две страны решают свои проблемы сами, заключают мирный договор, когда им удобно, им посредники не нужны. Вообще посредники не нужны. Сразу подчеркну, что Россия не играет никакую посредническую роль.

И третий этап – решение всех вопросов в комплексе, денуклеаризация полуострова, снятие санкций, определение какого-то разумного уровня вооружения в регионе, обсуждение вопросов иностранного военного присутствия. И, наконец, в финале, образование в шестистороннем формате то ли по типу ОБСЕ, то ли по какому-то другому типу, можно другие примеры, структуры безопасности. Где все государства, и, прежде всего, Северная Корея, будет чувствовать себя в первую очередь безопасно. Она должна получить коллективные или какие-то иные гарантии безопасности. Тогда отпадет необходимость в том, что происходит сейчас в этом нервном напряжении и на грани войны. Извините, я вроде уложился.

[KHLOPKOV] Спасибо большое. Я предлагаю, чтобы каждый последующий выступающий, в более практическом плане чтобы велась дискуссия, помимо своих идей может быть отталкивались от того, что сказал предыдущий коллега. И если он согласен, если это принимается, чтобы выстраивал свой комментарий на базе того, что уже было сказано. Если какие-то из предложений не принимаются, то очевидно, что необходимы альтернативные идеи. Подход, который некоторые официальные лица сегодня озвучивают, а именно, что те идеи, которые выдвигаются, нам неприемлемы, но в ответ ничего не предлагается. На мой взгляд, это тупиковый абсолютно вариант, поскольку он все дальше нас подталкивает к той эскалации, о которой мы уже говорили. Наш следующий докладчик – представитель Китая, директор и научный сотрудник Института контроля над вооружениями и исследований безопасности. Это тот институт, который находится в рамках большой организации, которая в свою очередь называется Китайский институт современных международных отношений. Доктор Гуо, пожалуйста.

[GUO]⁴ Thank you, Anton for inviting me to attend this very important conference. It is an honor to speak at this panel. I want to address three questions related to the

⁴ GUO Xiaobing, Director, Research Fellow, Institute of Security and Arms Control, China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations (CICIR), Chin



situation on the peninsula. The first question is how about the risk of the armed conflict on the Korean peninsula? The probability of the armed conflict on the Korean peninsula should be in decline at this point, because according to non-proliferation history, before a nation crossed the threshold of nuclear weapon development, the risk of armed conflict is high, but if a nation would have passed this threshold, the risk tended to decline. That is the history. For example, Israel conducted a surgical strike against Iraqi and Syrian reactors when these reactors are still under construction. And there is no other example when nuclear-armed states were attacked after they already acquired nuclear capability. And I think at this point nobody wants war on the peninsula. According to the CIA assessment, General Kim is a very rational actor, he is the last person, who wants the conflict on the peninsula.

Although President Trump talks about fire and fury, it seems to me that his aide, his former aide, Steve Bannon's comment seems to be more convincing. He said: "If we cannot effectively protect 100,000 of South Koreans from the attack from North Korea, then there is no possibility of the military option". But I want to remind that this possibility of miscalculation, misjudgment is very high. For example, as the U.S. sent B-1B bomber to the border of North Korea, North Korea might read it as a signal of war. And there are other sources of risks. For example, the cyber-attack against each other, that is very dangerous. And I am afraid that if today we have another Korean war, its influence will be much more significant than the war happened in the past on the peninsula. We had a lot of wars on the peninsula, and the Chinese are familiar with it since the 16th century. We had a war with Japan on the peninsula. But today its influence will be more significant because East Asia has become a very important part of the international economy and politics. So its influence will be more significant than as the last Korean war and since the war between Japanese and Russians. So we must take action.

The second question I want to address is can we apply the model of the Iran nuclear deal for the case of North Korea? This morning there are a lot of discussions about this question. My answer is yes and no. As Iran signs the deal with the P5+1, it gets no security guarantee or the normalization of the relationship with the U.S. But I think the case of North Korea is different. First, North Korea has already got the nuclear capability and Iran has not yet. Second, the development of the security situation in the Middle East is in favor of Iran. It has got the opportunity to expand its influence in the region. But for North Korea the situation is completely different. The North Triangle no longer exists. And the South Triangle consists of South Korea, Japan, America has been already strengthened. From the perspective of North Korea, the situation is very hostile. In the case of Iran we had negotiation talks lasting for 12 years. In the case of North Korea there are no ongoing talks. The six-party talks have been suspended for eight years. That is the problem. So I think the most valuable lesson we can learn from the case of Iran is that we must resume talks as soon as possible. But since the situation is different, we must pursue a parallel approach to push forward denuclearization and establishing everlasting peaceful mechanism on the peninsula at the same time.

The third question I want to address is what we should do as the next step? I think what is the most important, the top priority is the resumption of talks. China does not care whether it is bilateral, trilateral, multilateral talks. China does not care. If we can



have talks, we can reduce the possibility of miscalculation and misjudgment. That is very important. And through talks we have reached a very meaningful and important document in history. In 2005 we reached the September, 19th joint document. We drew a very good roadmap for denuclearization and establishment of a peaceful mechanism on the peninsula. And recently we have witnessed some positive signals from different parties. For example, the U.S. set the ‘four nos’ and the South Korean President is talking about the negotiations and talks. From our friends in DPRK I have heard some conflicting messages. But at least there are some messages that they also want to talk. I hope it reflects the strategy of the DPRK. So that is the background. China and Russia jointly released the statement in July. We call for a parallel approach, step by step approach. And we think that the most important part of the talks is “suspension for suspension”. Suspension of large-scale military exercise by the RoK and the U.S. and suspension of missile and nuclear activities by the DPRK. And I think we should make every effort to resume the talks. Every party should refrain from taking any new provocative actions. For example, the U.S. should stop the deployment of THAAD on the peninsula and should no longer talk about redeployment of tactical nuclear weapons on the peninsula. And furthermore, I think for our DPRK friends it is better to reconsider the possibility to test the hydrogen bomb in South Pacific. In the Cold War, the founding father of the DPRK Kim Il Sung initiated a nuclear weapons-free zone on the Korean peninsula. Almost everybody thinks that it is an impossible mission. But in 1991 Americans withdrew all the tactical nuclear weapons from the peninsula, and that impossible mission became possible. Now we face another impossible mission. We want to re-denuclearize and establish everlasting peaceful mechanism on the peninsula. I hope through our joint efforts we can again make that impossible mission possible. Thank you.

[**KHLOPKOV**] Спасибо, доктор Гуо, за Ваш такой финальный оптимизм. Наш следующий докладчик – Сюзан Димаджио, старший научный сотрудник исследовательского центра «Новая Америка» и одновременно директор одной из инициатив данной организации. Suzanne, please the floor is yours.

[**DIMAGGIO**]⁵ Thank you so much, Anton. I may begin by thanking you and Dmitry for organizing this fabulous conference and for inviting me. I am honored to be in this panel. We have a saying in the United States “to save the best for last” and I think in this case we have saved the most difficult for last, if I can say that. So yesterday’s panel on North Korea I think really set the stage for this discussion, so I will not go into that context, but let me just begin with a few words about the current situation and then I will present what I call “three priorities” of what we should be doing next. So the Administration, I would say, the Trump Administration and the leadership of North Korea have both unwisely engaged in an exchange of fiery statements and bellicose threats and now we are stuck in a dangerous escalating war of words. The use of war language used by the United States most prominently expressed in President Trump’s tweets and also his recent address at the UN General Assembly reinforces the North Korean perception of a permanently hostile United States and the belief that having the capability to strike the U.S. with nuclear weapons is the only way to safeguard the regime. From the U.S. point of view, the prospects for diplomacy are seriously diminished by the steady stream of belligerent threats from

⁵ **DIMAGGIO** Suzanne, Director, The U.S.-Iran Initiative; Senior Fellow, New America, United States



Pyongyang to the U.S. homeland, against its allies in the region and against the American forces in the region. These threats also serve to support the belief of many Americans that the North Korean leadership is inherently dangerous and if you look at the recent public opinion polling in my country, North Korea now is perceived as the top threat. Additionally, the U.S. perception, threat perception has increased significantly over the past year. U.S. intelligence estimates recently reduced their estimate for the time it will take North Korea to develop a reliable nuclear capable missile which can reach the continental U.S., to one year. These replaces earlier official estimates of roughly 4 years, give or take 12 months, and just the other day CIA director Pompeo mentioned a figure closer to five months.

So against the backdrop of what I have just described, we are hearing more talk in policy-making circles in Washington of kinetic options. Heightened U.S. military maneuvers over and around the Korean peninsula and provocative tests by North Korea like the recent missile that flew over Japan put fuel to this mutually enforcing cycle of escalation. So then longer this current course persists and intensifies the greater the chances for spiraling to a military conflict either by design or accident and miscalculation. So what should we do?

The first priority given the scenario that I just described, must be to deescalate the tensions. The priority now must be to cool things down and both sides should scale back the rhetoric. The personalization of attacks by both sides, by the leadership of both sides is particularly concerning and counterproductive and it should stop immediately.

The second priority is one that I aim at my own government of the United States now is to communicate a coherent policy toward North Korea. I think at the moment anyone of us would be very hard pressed to explain U.S. policy toward North Korea with any real certainty. Seeing the members of the Administration and the President himself are making contradictory statements on a consistent basis. This only adds to the risk of misinterpretation and miscalculation; it should be addressed as a matter of priority. I would contend that this is a moment that demands consistency and clarity. Of course, we have heard that the U.S. policy is now something called “maximum pressure and engagement”, sometimes it is called “peaceful pressure”. So I think the Administration should communicate the U.S.’s strong preference is to solve the issues that exist between Washington and Pyongyang through diplomacy and engagement. Pressure tactics, including sanctions and military options, of course remain on the table, but the government should speak in one voice in support of diplomatic engagement as the first choice.

And we also should speak very clearly that we are proceeding down this road in coordination with our close allies and our partners. My third priority is focused on getting productive talks on the way. Secretary Tillerson recently stated that there are a couple of channels that exist now of communication with North Korea. Washington should use an existing channel or perhaps initiate a new one with Pyongyang as a priority. One of the ways to proceed is to first engage, in what I would call, “bilateral talks about talks” without preconditions to explore what might be possible. This, in my opinion, would best be done very quietly through a ‘locky’ channel authorized at the very highest level in both capitals. The objectives would be to clarify current



policies, discuss potential points of compromise and also what are the non-negotiables, what are the red lines. And then set the ground work to move ahead to negotiations within the broader multilateral framework. I am suggesting a process, which is very similar to the one utilized by the American and Iranian officials that began in July 2012. Prior to the start of the official negotiations, American and Iranian diplomats engaged in a series of under-the-radar meetings, which they were able to keep secret, eventually leading to an interim agreement. I fully recognize that these two cases are very different, but I do think that these initial discussions made the result of the nuclear deal between the P5+1 and the EU possible. I would contend that given the high degree of mistrust that exists between Washington and Pyongyang, a similar approach with North Korea is needed. One of the major lessons we learned from this landmark of the deal, is that yes, diplomacy is very difficult and adversary, but it is not impossible. The U.S. should not limit discussion to the return of American detainees, which the White House spokeswoman recently said is the only topic is open for discussion. Focus also should be placed on other issues, exploring the possibility of getting talks started on those issues. The United States should recognize that North Korea will not adopt constraints as a precondition for getting talks underway and will not be abandoning the goal of denuclearization. We must set it aside in a short-term goal, because currently it is just outside the realm of possibility.

Instead the U.S. should be looking for a way to deescalate tensions as a way to gain attraction to the negotiations focused on what is achievable at this moment. A priority should be placed at reaching an interim freeze agreement on North Korea's nuclear and missile testing. Such an agreement would create space for further talks aimed at deterring North Korea from using and proliferating its nuclear weapons. And North Korea should recognize that for the U.S. and others talks cannot be sustained while Pyongyang is carrying out nuclear and long-range missile tests. I understand that public positions in both Washington and Pyongyang have rejected this proposal, but my understanding of current North Korea's policy is that they will not engage in talks until they finish the final steps of their nuclear project.

Meanwhile, it is important to note that senior Administration officials, most recently National Security Adviser McMaster recently said that deterrence with North Korea will not work. And this is very alarming and I think we are heading into a very dangerous territory. The idea of a freeze proposal should be reconsidered by both Pyongyang and my own government. In turn North Koreans should be expect to require that the U.S. reciprocate with restraints of its own, creating a more promising atmosphere. This could be done through some modification or adjustment of U.S. – RoK joint military exercises. Not a complete suspension, but perhaps adjustments and the scale composition, location and timing that could address North Korea's concerns without compromising the training and readiness of such exercises. Like the DPRK testing suspension, these exercises' modifications would remain as long as talks are on the way. If these discussions proved to be productive, it could open a way for other issues to be discussed.

Discussions are assurances that North Korea will not transfer weapons, fissile materials, dual-use technology, as well as chemical and biological weapons. Also talks on nuclear doctrine, such as “no-first-use”. The North Koreans contend that they cannot relinquish the nuclear program until the U.S. ends its hostile policies. In fact,



that was reiterated by madam Choe in the panel yesterday. So this indicates a degree of conditionality to some extent, and it should be fully pursued. How do the North Koreans define the U.S. hostile policy? How can it be addressed? This could be a very long-term and arduous discussion that would ultimately have to include peace agreement, security guarantees and so forth, but it is well worth placing of the agenda. Given the hard realities, we obviously cannot expect to proceed on the basis of mutual trust. It is a given. As such would I describe the “phased approach” that has confidence-building measures along the way. It is not a set recipe that describes many ingredients, it is rather to be illustrative of a sort of process we could pursue. Let me just conclude with this little story. Recently I was on the panel in Washington and I presented some of these ideas, and one of the participants disagreed with me vehemently. He said that we have tried diplomacy with North Koreans before, it is too hard. They cheat, they cannot be trusted. But in fact, the careful reading of the record shows that diplomacy between the U.S. and North Korea has succeeded in the past. It is the implementation that has failed. And because we failed in the past, it does not mean that we should not try again. Indeed, we should learn from these past attempts. Thank you.

[**KHLOPKOV**] Thank you, Suzanne, for practical suggestions, we agreed with Madam Choe Son Hui that during her seven minutes she will react on those comments that were made by previous speakers. So, Madam, you have seven minutes to react to those you would wish to react. After that we will have two commentators, and discussion then will be open for all participants. Please.

[**CHOE**]⁶ Ok. Maybe I have a couple of things to respond. As for the tension reduction on the Korean peninsula. I think that the DPRK did, does want to approach in a peaceful way, which means that we want to settle the issue in a peaceful and diplomatic way, but looking back at 25 years we have learned that diplomacy does not work with the United States. We tried all different formats of talks with the United States: bilateral, four-party talks and six-party talks. And what we have learnt from these talks is that this diplomacy gets to nowhere.

We made a strategic choice that we had to develop and strengthen our nuclear capability in order to deter the attack from the United States. And I do not think because of the time limitation I am going to reiterate what kind of nuclear threats the DPRK is under at present from the United States. But I think everyone here is fully aware what kind of pressure DPRK is under at present by the United States. I think we wake up with all these news coverages, where it says that B-1B is coming to the Korean peninsula again. Actually all these military exercises by the United States make the world very noisy and it really strengthens our determination that we should strengthen our nuclear capability and we should reach the balance of power with the United States. And we have come to the conclusion that this is the only way that we can save ourselves, safeguard my country and the peace on the Korean peninsula as well as the security in Northeast Asia.

If we did not have nuclear weapons, I think that you will easily guess that what my country’s destiny had been. We saw before our eyes that so many countries actually

⁶ **CHOE** Son Hui, President, Institute for American Studies (IFAS), Ministry of Foreign Affairs, DPRK



diminished by the nuclear threat by the United States. If they had the nuclear deterrence, their destinies might have been different. So make no mistake, DPRK is not going to repeat the same destiny that other nations had, that were actually yielded to the U.S. nuclear pressure and came out with poor destiny. And we are not going to trace the same destiny as other nations. So deterrence is the only way to defend ourselves is nuclear weapons that we have on our hands. If we did not have these nuclear weapons, I do not think there would have been my country by now. So we will strengthen our nuclear capabilities and we will hold to the nuclear weapons as long as the United States pursues hostile policy on the DPRK by trying to pressure militarily on the DPRK and also try to suffocate the DPRK by so called “UN sanctions” on the DPRK.

If the United States makes a right choice by deciding to abandon hostile policy and decides or makes a choice to co-exist with the nuclear-armed DPRK, then I think there will be a way out for the United States, otherwise we are not going to give up nuclear weapons and on the contrary, we will strengthen our nuclear weapons because this is the only way that can preserve peace on the Korean peninsula and avoid, prevent a possible war on the Korean peninsula. I think with each day the world is recognizing the significance and the points DPRK is making with regards to these nuclear weapons as deterrence to prevent war on the Korean peninsula. I am not going to repeat all the crazy utterances by Donald Trump with regard to DPRK. My nation is such a small nation, and we you are faced with this kind of statements by so-called President of this superpower in the world, like ‘fire and fury’, ‘locked and loaded’ and ‘calm before storm’, all these words are aimed at threatening the DPRK. So because we have nuclear weapons in our hands, so we are not threatened and we are very safe. So we will hold to these nuclear weapons as long as this kind of hostile policies by the U.S. Administration continue. I think this is my response to my previous presenters.

[KHLOPKOV] Thank you for your comment. But before I will give the floor to the commentators, Madam, I would like to have a question of clarification. You mentioned “abandon hostile policy”. Can you elaborate a bit more on particular steps the DPRK would expect from the U.S. side? What kind of issues, what kind of steps you mean when you mention “abandon hostile policy”? So it is no joint exercises or something else?

[CHOE] I think if we are to resolve this diplomatically and peacefully, that is very necessary that we have the right atmosphere for such a kind of talks. We have, you know, these threats coming out from Washington. You wake up with these tweets by Trump talking about ‘fire and fury’ each morning. And I really do not think you are willing to be at the table with the United States, who is up to strangle your country. So what we need is the right atmosphere. We do not want any nuclear threats from the United States. We want the United States to abandon its barbarous sanctions on the DPRK. Of course, it has been an exercise, it has been practiced under name of the UN sanctions, the UN Resolutions, but it has been led by the United States to suffocate my country, so that they want to see my country collapse with these barbarous sanctions on my country. So if the United States continues with these military and nuclear threats on DPRK as well as these economic sanctions, we are not moving an inch in this nuclear weapons area.



[KHLOPKOV] Thank you for your comment. Now we have two commentators. Первый наш комментатор – профессор Корейской национальной Дипломатической академии Министерства иностранных дел Республики Корея, в прошлом – Генеральный директор по вопросам политического планирования МИД, доктор Син Бем Чой. Пожалуйста.

[SHIN]⁷ Thank you, Anton. And I also thank the Russian government for having me at this wonderful event. For the last two days I have learnt a lot. I also thank all the speakers for their wonderful presentations. Since I am the commentator, I promise that I will be really frank, which means that I do not necessarily represent any view of the Korean government. When I studied at the Georgetown University for my doctor degree, my supervising professor always emphasized that you must understand the three things to understand international relations: one is a fact, the other is a rule, then there is a conclusion. Without those three you cannot be a good practitioner as a government official or ever a good professor. So I will explain my position with this kind of three steps. So the first one is the fact. My North Korean friends and sisters all will say that North Korea cannot help developing a nuclear weapon because of the United States hostile policy. Let me start with the explanation of the international relations. Every country is hostile to the other, every country. Look at even the U.S. – Russia relations. They are very hostile regarding Ukraine. And even Russia – China relations - they are friendly, but in the Central Asia we can see some kind of a competition. This is the reality of international relations. But on the other hand, we have another aspect of international relations. That is friendship and cooperation. So we always define international relations by competition and cooperation. Hostility and friendship. North Korea always emphasizes the U.S. hostile policy, but here is the fact that for the last 10 years the United States and Korea never used force on the North Korean territory. On the other side, North Korea in the year of 2010 attacked the Korean territory and killed innocent Korean people, civilians. Who is more hostile? I do not want to blame North Koreans for doing this, because I want to explain the nature of international relations and political dynamics of Northeast Asia. My North Korean friend always emphasizes the UN sanctions. This is true, but remember, every UN sanction comes out after every North Korea's missile test and nuclear test. And those kind of bad words from the President Trump come only after North Korea's missile test and nuclear test. I don't want to defend it, but anyway, that is the truth.

To build the bright future, I think, we have to think about what is our rule, what is our conventional wisdom. What is the rule in the international community regarding nuclear weapons? What is that? It is the non-proliferation regime. That is that effort that Russia, and my friend Anton working for this seminar, I believe that. The non-proliferation regime does not come from one person's idea. It is the common idea of the international community and collective wisdom. My North Korean friend and sister said that India and Pakistan have nuclear weapons, why not North Korea? But yesterday I learned from former Chinese Ambassador saying that India and Pakistan's nuclear weapons do not make any contribution for the stability and peace of the international community and neither does North Korea's nuclear weapon. I support this idea. Again, I do want to blame North Korea. I would like to say the third thing and talk about what is the solution. This is my main idea. Let me first thank all the

⁷ SHIN Beomcheol, Professor, Korea National Diplomatic Academy (KNDA); Fmr. Director-General for Policy Planning, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA, 2013-2016), Republic of Korea



participants from all the countries, all the specialists who are trying to make contribution to non-proliferation and denuclearization of the Korean peninsula. I appreciate the Russian government for holding this meeting and proceed with some sort of effort for the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula. Of course, I have some doubts why Russia is so hectic. My job is a security analyst, so I have to put every concern, every doubt on every country's behavior. However, I really thank Russia. Why? Because the eventual solution in this matter is dialogue, discussion. So Russia's suggestion - I love it. But the program is how to restart and how to proceed. These are the two major questions when we talk about the dialogue. So how do we start? Russia said it is double-suspension, but North Korea opposed to that and the United States opposed that.

But there is another opportunity. Since November, 1 until April 28, there is no major military drill in the Korean peninsula. And if North Korea does not test nuclear weapon, does not test missiles, there is de-facto nuclear suspension. Use this time for the opportunity for a dialogue. Without any condition we can dialogue. How do we proceed? There is a famous word by my North Korean friend "action by action" - on the one hand, the denuclearization that is what we want, on the other hand, North Korea's security concern, economic concern and no hostile policy. So we can come together in "action by action" and solve the problem. That is the answer.

My last point is, this is my sincere hope, please accept the South Korean government's proposal for dialogue. I am working for the former government, more conservative, but this government has a really good intention, trying to improve inter-Korean relations, decrease the tension and establish a peace regime, and then, peaceful co-existence. Take this opportunity, I believe that this is the only opportunity that will give a better world to the next generation. So this is the end. And I just want to add one question. Since Director Choe mentioned the end of hostile policy. Is it a starting point, a dialogue, or some kind of a condition of a North Korean action of the denuclearization? Thank you.

[**KHLOPKOV**] Thank you, mister Shin. We will have time to react to your points later, but to one of them I would like to react right now. I think it is a wrong perception that the Russian government hosts this Conference. It is organized and hosted by the Center for Energy and Security Studies, which is a non-governmental think-tank. The Russian Foreign Ministry is one of the partners, the Russian Nuclear State Corporation is one of the partners, but we also have aid from others, including international organizations on board. So it is our responsibility. If you do not like lunch, if the soup is too salty, it is us to be blamed for, not the Russian government. Сейчас у нас еще один комментатор, доктор Толорая, руководитель Управления региональных проектов в фонде «Русский мир», директор Центра исследований Азии Института экономики Российской академии наук. Длинный список должностей доктора Толорая можно продолжать до бесконечности. Георгий Давыдович, пожалуйста.

[**TOLORAYA**]⁸ Well, I will speak English. I have been doing Korean studies for 40 years and never in my memory I remember that kind of very tense situation. Well I

⁸ **TOLORAYA** Georgy, Chair, Regional Programs, "Russkiy Mir" Foundation; Director, Asian Strategy Center, Institute of Economics, Russian Academy of Sciences (RAS), Russian Federation



think why it happened, it is due to absence of both sides - of the DPRK and the U.S., sometimes assisted by South Korea, sometimes it is not, like right now. Probably if we take recent decades if North Korea have stopped at the point of the first nuclear test when they wanted to have nuclear deterrent and haven't increased their missile and nuclear potential at such a speed, probably then the situation would have been calmer now. At least the U.S. President wouldn't be threatening almost daily to destroy the country, there would be no encompassing sanctions, no economic blockade. And at the same time the DPRK security would have been more or less guaranteed.

On the other hand, I remember since 1989 I have been constantly talking to my American and South Korean colleagues both officially and unofficially, telling them please do not think that the DPRK would collapse or disappear by itself. And still I have only heard during 25 years, you do not understand, this is a communist country, we should follow the usual route of history, it will soon, maybe not tomorrow, maybe not in a year, collapse. So the only thing we should do is to help it, do it in a soft manner. And then the nuclear problem would be solved, so we will not need to make any compromises. So the result of this U.S. policy - we can see now. I do not want to blame the U.S. government for that, because the situation is broader. It is the all-encompassing understanding of the situation by the United States establishment. And

I understand that it is very difficult for the U.S. to make a strategic decision to try not only this pressure and isolation approach, but something else. Because diplomacy has not been actually tried, what was tried is trying to make an agreement and then to break it from the both sides. So now we are at the crucial point. We can continue like that for some time more. I would not even exclude a limited conflict, a limited military action, like U.S. strike on some North Korean object and North Korea retaliating in a limited manner, not starting an encompassing war. And it would happen any time in this situation, tomorrow, next month. But anyway, the sides will have to come to the need to negotiate, to find a compromise. And unfortunately, I believe that the bulk of this decision lies in Washington. And I think that Washington, as a strong adversary, a stronger country, should make some wise strategic decision.

Therefore, I really liked Suzanne's presentation, I can almost undersign all of it, because compromise and negotiations at least would defuse the current crisis. And I would like to stress the Russian-Chinese roadmap proposal. The most important part out of three stages is number one, is to start talking and negotiate, freeze hostilities on the both sides. We can talk for 20, 30 years, but it will be no war for that time, North Korea would be obliged to stop its nuclear missile development, while the U.S. would have to stop sanctions and pressure. I have been to North Korea last week. And I saw a country, which is developing its economy and people's life has really got better over the last years. But I could clearly feel that the sanctions will undermine this process. That the sanctions that we have now will soon take their toll, especially this winter. Already in the northeastern areas there is no gasoline, because it is not delivered from Russia. So I think this is not the right thing to treat the people of the country, even if it is a hostile country. And it is important to start talking as soon as possible. So to economize on my time I will end now. I am sure that the people on the both sides of



the ocean, as well as in the capitals of the major six-party partners are wise enough to avoid the worst case scenario and it is possible. The only thing we should do is just start talking, maybe even at this conference. And then, I am sure, the worst will not happen, and I am really sure that this can be achieved. Tomorrow the large group of Korean experts from Russia, including myself, is going to Korea. So we would like to prove by our own example that we do not believe in an imminent war. If we are wrong, it means that our expertise was bad. But I hope it will not happen. Thank you.

[**KHLOPKOV**] Спасибо доктор Толорая. У нас есть не более 20 минут чтобы задать короткие вопросы, и чтобы потом дать возможность еще 15 минут нашим панелистам ответить или выступить с комментарием. Но я прошу всех участников сфокусироваться в первую очередь на том, что делать. Целый ряд очень интересных предложений и от наших докладчиков, и от комментаторов прозвучали, поэтому давайте сфокусируемся что делать. Адмирал Гауэр.

[**GOWER**]⁹ Thank you. John Gower from the United Kingdom. I think I am safe in saying that this maybe is the only source of the tension in the world that cannot be directly attributed to the United Kingdom as centuries passed. I would offer three things and one question, which I ask not to answer it, but perhaps to think about. Firstly, not everything you do to reassure and to achieve deterrence should be done every time. And so what is being done with the U.S. reassurance exercises may be counterproductive and, perhaps not necessary to either reassure or to prove that the U.S. has the capability. So perhaps the countries wishing to be assured should have a quiet conversation to say: no this is not necessary, right now we remain assured. My second point is that in the areas where we have dealt with very bad past events - the Northern Island problem and indeed the end of apartheid in South Africa, - it is necessary to talk to people that you have violent disagreements within the past and to swallow some words that you have said in the past. So here is my question, and I do not expect the answer, but I will pose it anyway. What words that have been said in the past 45 months with the proponents be willing to swallow in order not to go to war? Thank you.

[**ZHEBIN**]¹⁰ Спасибо. Жебин, Центр корейских исследований Института Дальнего Востока РАН. Мне кажется, что одно из решений могло бы быть разделение ракетной и ядерной программ. Почему? Проблема американо-северокорейских отношений всегда была проблемой верификации. Из-за этого случился первый ядерный кризис, когда МАГАТЭ потребовало инспекции двух дополнительных объектов и шестисторонние переговоры встали из-за проблемы верификации. Ракетная проблема верифицируется национальными средствами контроля, и, поэтому, самую сложную проблему в любом соглашении с Северной Кореей и вообще в любом соглашении по разоружению могли бы обойти. И второй момент то что вот наш американский коллега, я думаю, что неслучайно сказала, что проблема в том, чтобы Северная Корея прекратила ядерные испытания и запуски ракет большой дальности. Я думаю, что

⁹ **GOWER** John, Rear Admiral, Director, Mimir Consulting Ltd; Fmr. Assistant Chief of Defence Staff (Nuclear, Chemical, Biological, 2011-2014), Ministry of Defence, United Kingdom

¹⁰ **ZHEBIN** Alexandr, Director, Center for Korean Studies (CKS), Institute of Far Eastern Studies (IFES), Russian Academy of Sciences (RAS), Russian Federation



американцы понимают, что полностью запретить Северной Корее иметь ракеты невозможно. Ни одна страна в мире на это не согласится, и тем более, все соседние страны имеют ракеты. Вот разделение, что кстати предлагали сами американские специалисты, в том числе связанные с Пентагоном. Разрешить Северной Корее, признать ее право на запуски спутников, поскольку любому специалисту ясно, это запуск спутника, вывод какого-то груза на орбиту, либо это испытание межконтинентальной баллистической ракеты. А взамен получить возможность то же молчаливое согласие Северной Кореи на отказ от запусков и испытаний межконтинентальных баллистических ракет и боеголовок к ним. Вот такой компромисс, возможно, с этого компромисса можно было бы начать. И если бы он завершился успешно, то перейти к более сложным вопросам, конечно, ядерного разоружения, поскольку они потребуют, безусловно, инспекций на местах, а это, вы знаете, самый скорее сложный вопрос.

[KITANO]¹¹ Thank you very much. My name is Mitsuru Kitano, I am a Japanese Ambassador in Vienna. I have a question to be addressed to experts from Russia and the United States. I appreciate what Professor Shin said and I believe there are two things to be discussed. One is how to start and the other is a hot war to be unpursued. As it has been highlighted in our discussion, from our standpoint, the main goal to be pursued is denuclearization of the Korean peninsula together with peaceful co-existence. So I would like to ask two experts, one from Russia and the other is from the United States. The Russian expert mentioned about security and active negotiations in Northeast Asia is to be pursued. And the U.S. expert mentioned about we have to touch upon the issue of non-proliferation aspect. But I would like to ask how do you think about denuclearization as final goal to be pursued? Thank you very much.

[ИЛЬИЧЁВ]¹² Александр Ильичёв, консультант. Но вот теперь действительно я на полном серьезе благодарю Центр энергетики и безопасности, его директора Антона Хлопкова и всех тех, кто приехал сюда за то, что мы имеем возможность впервые, при все при том, что эксперты ездят к друг другу, говорят, обсуждают, но на самом деле площадок, и по-настоящему серьезных обсуждений все это уже давно не происходит. Все это происходит в каком-то виртуальном пространстве, где друг друга никто не понимает и не слышит, но мы, как всем уже ясно, оказались в такой точке процесса, где дальше уже только дорога в пропасть. Относительно того, что делать.

Ну, во-первых, эта конференция для меня лично еще раз кое-что прояснила. Спасибо представителям КНДР, которые приехали сюда. Спасибо всем другим, кто тоже это сделал и, главное, внес свой вклад. Альтернативы многостороннему подходу нет. При всем уважении, и, конечно, необходимости двусторонних диалогов и КНДР – США, и межкорейского диалога и многих других. Но многостороннему подходу нет альтернативы. Почему? Как

¹¹ KITANO Mitsuru, Permanent Representative, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of Japan to the International Organizations in Vienna

¹² ILITCHEV Alexander, Senior Consultant, United Nations Office of Counter-Terrorism; Fmr. Principal Adviser to the Personal Envoy of the U.N. Secretary-General for the Korean Peninsula (2003–2005), Russian Federation



выяснилось, ни одна страна не может решить в одиночку на двусторонней основе разные проблемы, которые сошлись воедино в этой точке земного шара. У нас есть основа. При всем скептицизме в отношении шестисторонних переговоров. Это Совместное заявление 2005 года. Никто ничего лучше не предложил.

Другое дело, как было сказано, имплементация, реализация этой договоренности. Надо сделать выводы, извлечь уроки и двигаться дальше. Чего не хватает? Вот сейчас КНДР еще раз четко сказала, что их волнует, что им нужно. Вместо того, чтобы отметить это, как это было раньше, приклеивать ярлыки и т.д. нужно просто серьезно к этому отнестись. Дальше. У нас есть двусторонняя инициатива России и Китая. Чего не хватает? Не хватает того, чтобы «нарастить мясо». Пока нет какого-то официального диалога, нужно пятёрке в первую очередь, тем странам-участницам шестисторонних переговоров не стесняться неофициально работать друг с другом, что можно конкретно, субстантивно в эту карту добавлять, дорабатывать и договариваться, с тем, чтобы в результате или уже в рамках официального переговорного процесса, включающего КНДР, или неофициального и здесь неоценимы совершенно усилия, которые предпринимает организация госпожи Демаджио, которой нет просто замены. Это просто бесценно – сохранять эти неофициальные каналы общения, переговоров, обмена мыслями. Понимаете, с тем, чтобы в результате всего этого на столе появился такой пакет разносторонних предложений, который бы по-настоящему был бы интересен КНДР и отвечал бы интересам и обеспокоенностям других участников переговоров, в первую очередь стран региона. Спасибо.

[BUNN]¹³ So in the spirit of the usual Russian view of ‘step by step’ it seems to me that the most urgent thing is steps to reduce the risk of inadvertent stumbling into conflict right now. And I wonder if there are potential arrangements could be made that could reduce that risk, whether it is arrangements on incidents at sea, some arrangements on fewer flights within some certain distances of the DMZ, whether it is additional hotlines for communication, including between the militaries on each side. It seems to me there is sort of immediate need for thinking through things that could reduce the risk of stumbling into conflict.

[LEE]¹⁴ Thank you, Anton. My name is Sang-hwa Lee, Director-General for North Korean Nuclear Affairs in the RoK. When we have a mixed bag, when we have negative forces and positive forces, the most urgent and important task is to minimize risk and maximize opportunities. Let me present three priorities. First. I think the most prominent positive factor we have is that we have at the Korean government, the current Korean government is one of the most forthcoming government to dialogue and engagement. As many previous speakers have stressed, when we have no reliable and effective channel of communication, it is a greater risk of inadvertent the escalation of tensions. So I think the ball is in the court of North Korea. Let me stress our offer, that sincere offer that our President presented on July, 17 for reinstalling the

¹³ BUNN Matthew, Professor of Practice, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, United States

¹⁴ LEE Sang-hwa, Director-General for North Korean Nuclear Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Fmr. Assistant to the U.N. Secretary General (2007-2014), Republic of Korea



military-military dialogue and reunion of separated families. Second. The most important thing at the moment is to manage the situation in a stable manner.

As Dr. Suzanne Dimaggio mentioned, we need cooling down, the time-out period. When we look ahead down the road, we have some important occasions and roadmaps. One of the most important things is President Trump is making his first tour in the region. So we need to make best out of it, utilizing every possible occasion. When political situation is in standstill, we need to utilize humanitarian or a sport event, because in many times those occasions can serve as a good catalyst. So between the U.S. and the DPRK you may consider making use of a detainee issue. And last point is we have a very important sport event in February next year. The Korean government is trying its best to make PyeongChang Winter Olympics and Paralympics as games of peace, which will help cease tension and create a favorable environment for inter-Korean dialogue and cooperation. Thank you.

[KHLOPKOV] Спасибо. Посол Ли, на мой взгляд, очень важный тезис который также ранее здесь звучал в отношении диалога. Опять же, фантазируя, наверное, если будет интерес в обеих столицах приехать в Москву как научно-исследовательская организация Центр энергетики и безопасности готова свою площадку предоставить. Но, для этого важно, чтобы обе стороны, включая Республику Корея, были готовы в двустороннем формате говорить по всем вопросам. Посол Ли, Вы мне напомнили о том, что мне нужно вернуться к одной из пометок, которую я сделал во время выступления доктора Шина, что США против прекращения совместных учений в регионе. Для меня это не аргумент, это же совместные учения Южной Кореи и США. Они не могут продолжаться, потому что одна сторона настаивает. Если одна из сторон скажет, что надо остановиться, то этого будет достаточно для того, чтобы учения прекратились. Поэтому этот аргумент, что американцы против прекращения учений, поэтому они продолжатся, мне не совсем понятен. Если Южная Корея заинтересована в обсуждении всего спектра вопросов, то безусловно отсылать для решения каких-либо проблем из всего спектра в Вашингтон было бы неправильно. Два последних вопроса, которые есть возможность задать – это Ангела Кейн и Дэвид Санторо.

[KANE]¹⁵ I have a very quick intervention. Whenever I hear the representatives of the DPRK speak, it is always a matter between the DPRK and the United States. I mean, obviously, it is not only between those two countries. It is the message that comes across is that you are not looking at what other countries to get involved and my question to Madam Choe is it possible for the multilateral approach? And I am saying that because it was discussed a lot through the last two days, the value of the JCPOA and also the factor there are seven countries in that agreement and six of them are very willing to hold on to it does guarantee the effect and the implementation of the agreement. Is there any role for other countries in this the DPRK vs the United States engagement?

¹⁵ KANE Angela, Senior Fellow, Vienna Center for Disarmament and Non-Proliferation (VCDNP); Fmr. U.N. High Representative for Disarmament Affairs (2010-2015), Germany/Austria



[**SANTORO**]¹⁶ Hi. David Santoro, Pacific Forum CSIS. I think that my question was already partially asked so I want to rephrase it a little bit. I think in talking about engagement we tend to focus on ultimate goals we are shooting for and immediate things that we can do, but I want to challenge the panel to think in terms of medium-term goals. Can we actually identify these goals, not necessarily where we want to end up, but in the medium-term's outcome that could be acceptable to all parties? And if you could maybe elaborate a little bit on that. Thank you.

[**KHLOPKOV**] We cannot to give the very last opportunity to speak to Doctor Blix. Please, Doctor Blix.

[**BLIX**]¹⁷ Thank you very much, Chairman. I fully agree with the proposals of meetings, dialogue etc. But it occurred to me that the Ambassador of Korea said that between November 1 and April 28 next year there will be no big military maneuvers. But perhaps there my understanding of how it could be reached. North Korea would not test any missile or weapon during this period if that is so then the U.S. would suspend that military maneuver. That would be a start.

[**KHLOPKOV**] Thank you, Doctor Blix. Now all four panelists will have up to 5 minutes to react, respond to those points which have been made. It is up to you to choose. We do not have too much time, so please, try to identify those ideas, which you believe can work. And we will start in reverse order, so I invite Madam Choe to speak first and Suzanne Dimaggio will be next. Madam, please, those questions that you would like to react to.

[**CHOE**] So I think the multilateral engagement is a very important element in settling issues and we are not excluding these multilateral efforts in trying to resolve the nuclear issue on the Korean peninsula. And I think there will be the time when we look at other countries to get engaged in multilateral format to settle the nuclear issue on the Korean peninsula. But as for now I really do not think there will be much roles to be played by other countries rather than the United States, because at present we are not threatened by other countries. And direct military and nuclear threats are coming from the United States. And it is the United States, who is aimed at strangling my country and trying to bring down the DPRK. So at present we have to face the reality and we have to settle the problem with the United States. What do you think the other countries can do maybe in the sanctions area? Maybe other countries can play some role? As the United States not to go ahead with such a kind of barbaric sanctions on the DPRK. I think that kind of roles are very much welcomed. But as for military and nuclear threat, we are actually having it from the United States and not other countries.

So why not other countries ask the United States to abandon the hostile policy on the DPRK? So maybe these joint efforts, this kind of demands from other countries rather than from the DPRK alone, can make a role in persuading and making the United States make the right solution. So, of course, we do welcome other countries to join us

¹⁶ **SANTORO** David, Director and Senior Fellow for Nuclear Policy, Pacific Forum CSIS, France/United States

¹⁷ **BLIX** Hans, Member of the CTBTO Group of Eminent Persons (GEM); Fmr. Minister of Foreign Affairs (1978-1979); Fmr. IAEA Director General (1981-1997), Sweden



in asking the United States to abandon its hostile policy on the DPRK. And as of now I think many of people are taking about six-party talks and also the Joint Statement of September 19, 2005.

I think if you look at the documents and also the statements made by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, you will find out that the position on six-party talks released by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, it says, they did it at April 12 as far as I remember, that we then regarded the six-party talks as ineffective anymore and we want to first of all settle the issue with the United States. And at present as long as we see a hostile policy and nuclear threat by the United States, we are not going into six-party format. And we are not committed to the September 19 Joint Statement, which asks the DPRK the denuclearize the Korean peninsula, because we are under the constant nuclear threat by the United States and we have to have nuclear weapons to deter the U.S. attacks on the DPRK. And we believe more than ever at present that the nuclear weapons are the only reliable means to deter the U.S. nuclear threat and attack on the DPRK and without that we cannot deter those threats and attacks from the United States. And I want to briefly refer to your comment from South Korea.

I heard what you said, if I am not correct, correct me, you do not see any hostile policy coming out from the Trump administration. I want to ask you. How much more hostile words you have to hear from Trump and you characterize that as hostile policy on the DPRK? So I do not know who is your teacher, but this is ineligible fact and these are the statements made by so-called President of the United States, so we cannot ignore this kind of statements and when I hear many people worry about miscalculation by our Supreme leadership, I think that our Supreme leadership is wise enough to identify as to whether this is what it means, all these statements coming from the U.S. at the top level. So do not worry about that miscalculation. But I think that our supreme leadership has a full will to treat the United States in its own way. So that is my response.

[DIMAGGIO] Thanks to all the panelists and participants, I have learnt a great deal from your comments, from the commentators as well. I have got three questions and I will run through them very quickly because I know that we are short of time. So the gentleman here asked what words we would be willing to swallow in order not to go to war. Again I think this is where we could learn from the experience with Iran during those quiet talks and of course, the rhetoric between the U.S., between Washington and Tehran, was just as harsh, just as escalatory. But I think that during these quiet discussions that happened in Amman, in Geneva, in New York, both Americans and Iranians managed to come to better understanding of each other. We had a panel earlier today on sanctions and I think the general feeling was that these were not sanctions alone that brought Iranians to the table - it was specifically during these talks the U.S. officials were able to convey authoritatively to the Iranian counterparts that regime change was no longer a strategic objective of the United States. We need to do the same thing with the North Koreans.

Also we indicated an agreement for the Iranians to maintain the uranium enrichment program on their soil under heavy monitoring and verification, of course, but these are the sorts of ways we can communicate these things and that is why I am a big



advocate for initial bilateral talks. And then of course to move on to multilateral talks, which are very much needed. And getting to that question, I would think our North Korean colleagues would welcome the multilateral framework, because as we've now seen, with this historic nuclear deal with Iranians, which is working by the way. It is the international community, our European partners, our Chinese colleagues, Russian colleagues that are saving this deal from blowing up. So I think that would be reassurance to our North Korean friends of why multilateral framework would mean so much.

And the question about satellites. I am going to give my personal view here it is certainly not my government's view. But I think this is an area where we should be open for some negotiation. Of course, under strict monitoring again, I think this could be a big benefit for us to get monitors back on the ground in North Korea. And we should look for ways to create proposals to address this topic. The question on what is the final goal. I think for the United States at this point of time, there is no question that any American official that comes to the table has to come with the mission that denuclearization is the final goal. And as I said earlier, we should not abandon it. But at this stage we must be realistic and set it aside, but not abandon it. And we cannot set a time frame of when this main goal will happen. If we enter the talks with North Korean colleagues declaring it as an endgoal but not specifying what the timing would be, I think that is the way to get the talks started.

Someone asked about how to reduce the risk of inadvertent conflict, there is immediate need for this. I wish we could just jump to the process that we had with the Iranians, when the foreign minister Kerry and foreign minister Zarif had each other cellphone numbers and they were able to call each other. And my understanding is that they called each other quite frequently. If you remember there was an incident in the Persian Gulf, when the U.S. sailors went stray a bit and were captured by the Iranian Navy. And that was resolved so quickly because of that immediate connection. Could we get to the point where foreign minister Ri Yong-ho and Secretary of State Tillerson have each other cellphone numbers? I hope so. But in the meantime we need to have our intermediate steps, establishment of some hot line, upgrade of the New York channel. Let us think creatively how we could do that. Someone mentioned the utility of sports exchanges, people-to-people exchanges. The fact is now we are in a very unfortunate situation where there is a travel ban on the U.S. citizens going to North Korea. And understandably given what happened to Mr. Otto Warmbier and that tragedy, but I am personally against this ban. I was in North Korea, it was my third visit just earlier this year, I would like to return. I know there are a lot of humanitarian workers I would like to have access and people-to-people exchanges, academics. So I am hoping that would get back on track. On this connection I would urge my North Korean colleagues to release the remaining three American prisoners being held in Pyongyang immediately. And if that is not possible, in the near future, at very least please allow them consular visits. As many of you know we do not have an embassy in Pyongyang and our Swedish friends are protecting power, so they should have access to the Americans that are being held there. So I would say in the interest of helping to reestablish the possibility for Americans to travel to North Korea. Please do that as a humanitarian gesture. Plain and simple. Please, do that.



In terms of medium-term goals I think I was asked over here, maybe this is a medium-term goal, I would like to see it as a short-term goal, and that would be an establishment of intersections. A U.S. intersection in Pyongyang, North Korean intersection in Washington. That would be another way to tackle this problem of how to have a channel to avoid miscalculation and inadvertent conflict. These are the things that can be done creatively right away or in a medium-term. And I also mention a few other things that we should be discussing that I would put on the medium-term timeline. The most urgent for me is some clarification on how the North Koreans see non-proliferation, what assurances they can provide not only to us, but our allies in the region and the international community as a whole of what they are willing to do to make sure we feel reassured that they will not transfer weapons, fissile material and so forth. So these are my suggestions.

[**KHLOPKOV**] Thank you, Suzanne. Doctor Guo.

[**GUO**] I will try to address two questions. The first question is about satellite launch. Besides the nuclear issue my another interest is space cooperation. It is our official position, we support the UN Resolution. But personally I think we should encourage space cooperation on the issue to discuss the further possibility of allowing the DPRK to launch a satellite. This is just my personal opinion. And second I want to talk more about the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula. Actually the denuclearization of the peninsula is also a controversial topic in China, because the target of North Korea's nuclear arsenal is America just as Ms. Choe suggested yesterday. China is so concerned about it. Recently I have read a lot about the Korean history, which was published in the 1960s and the 1970s under the guidance of the former leader of the DPRK Kim Il-sung. And I have read some of his books. I am not quite familiar with what he had experienced in the past decades. I found that General Kim Il-sung is a very great leader, a far-seeing person. When I was a kid, Chinese kids admired the DPRK very much. They were much richer than us. They could eat apples. Their films, movies, were very popular at the time in China. We also admired his thoughts. For example, he respected intellectuals. During Cultural revolution, we stupidly criticized and exiled these intellectuals, but North Korea respected intellectuals. At the founding of the DPRK, there are just dozens of college students graduates. But under the rule of Kim Il-sung there was 1.2 million intellectuals. He said: with 1.2 million intellectuals we can create all kinds of miracles. Yes, this is very important. And on the nuclear issue I also think that Kim Il-sung was very far-seeing. He promoted the initiative of the nuclear weapon free-zone on the Korean peninsula. I think he considered the interest of the offsprings, not only himself. Now North Korea has conducted six tests. And after the September 3 test, there is another earthquake we heard on September 23. I am really afraid of the potential danger of radioactive leakage. I think this is for the interests not only for the neighbors but for the people. For the offsprings, because the Korean people have been living on the peninsula for five thousand years and have been helping neighbors for five thousand years. Take care of your own kid. Your grandkid. And also take care of your neighbors. That is also important.

[**KHLOPKOV**] Thank you, doctor Guo. One minute. And after that Ambassador Burmistrov will have his 5 minutes.



[CHOE] As for the comment by the Chinese I do not know his name, I will refrain from making comments on each Chinese leaders, but I have to respond to his comment. My leadership, our respected Supreme leader comrade Kim Jong-un is equally wise and equally far-sighted. And he is leading our country in a very wise way. And the entire Korean people and the entire Korean army are upholding his wise leadership. And we believe him. And we believe in his leadership and I do believe that my country and my people will emerge victorious under his wise leadership. So this is my response. So I want you to be cautious when you talk about the leaders of other countries.

[KHLOPKOV] Thank you, madam Choe. Пять минут, Олег Николаевич.

[BURMISTROV] Мне тоже показался интересным и важным вопросом, который задал наш японский коллега из Вены о роли денуклеаризации в процесс урегулирования. На наш взгляд, инновация, которую предлагают российская и китайская сторона, roadmap, дорожной карты, в том, что конечной целью урегулирования является комплексное решение всех вопросов на полуострове с учетом существующих между всеми странами, и конечная цель – это создание механизма мира и безопасности в регионе, где безопасность каждой страны, включая КНДР, будет гарантирована полностью. Денуклеаризация – это часть проблемы, очень важная, но часть проблемы. И решать ее, ставить ее во главу угла как конечную цель, методологически неправильно. Много лет этим занималось международное сообщество, пытаясь решить проблему денуклеаризации в отрыве от других проблем полуострова. Ни к чему хорошему это наша идея заключается в том, чтобы решать эти вопросы в комплексе. Как можно добиться полной и верифицируемой денуклеаризации не решив массу других проблем. А проблема обычных вооружений в т.н. «демилитаризованной зоне», которая является самой милитаризованной зоной в мире, где десятки тысяч артиллерии находится с обеих сторон? А проблема противоракетной обороны, включая ТНААД в Южной Корее? Разве это не нуждается в решении? А проблема уровня иностранного военного присутствия в регионе? Стратегическая авиация американская, постоянное присутствие авианосных групп в регионе. Как же мы хотим решить проблему денуклеаризации, если поставить ее во главе угла, оставив все остальные аспекты, включая санкции против КНДР, оставить что, отдельно? Нет, только в комплексе и в рамках международного шестистороннего (желательно шестистороннего) процесса можно решить проблему и создать гарантии безопасности равные для всех, и, включая, безусловно, проблему денуклеаризации всего полуострова. Вот методологически это очень важно понимать. Не нужно отрывать одну проблему от другой и решать в отдельности. Только в комплексе. А начинать с простых вещей, о которых шла речь. Успокоиться и дать диалогу поработать, а потом все остальное.

[KHLOPKOV] I think it was a very useful, extraordinary discussion. We have not resolved all the problems we face in the region. And I think we should be realistic that it takes time. But the problem that we discuss does not have much time. It is late evening, it is time to be back to our families. But before I will announce that the conference is over...



Я хотел бы поблагодарить партнеров, благодаря которым конференция состоялась: это Офис ООН по разоружению, Подготовительная комиссия по Договору о всеобъемлющем запрещении ядерных испытаний, МИД России, Госкорпорация «Росатом» и АО «Техснабэкспорт», МИД Нидерландов, МИД Норвегии, Федеральный Департамент по международным делам Швейцарии, МИД Финляндии, Фонд Горчакова, Фонд Эберта; коллег по Центру энергетики и безопасности: Дмитрия Конухова, Асю Шаврову, Надежду Масленникову. Особая благодарность нашим волонтерам. Большинство из них – студенты МИФИ: Александра Капкова, Мария Кондакова, Анна Лебедева, Светлана Ляпина, Анастасия Печёнкина, Илья Самбурский, Денис Сафиканов, Юля Фомина, Варвара Яровая. Также нам помогала студентка МГЛУ Мария Мясникова. Особая благодарность переводчикам. Без них мы бы понимали друг друга еще хуже.