



## **CONCURRENT SESSION III**

### **«JCPOA and Progress on Civil Nuclear Cooperation with Iran»<sup>1</sup>**

#### **MOSCOW NONPROLIFERATION CONFERENCE**

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[**КХЛОПКОВ**]<sup>2</sup> First of all I would like to thank our speakers for being disciplined. Please double-check that all of you have interpretation equipment, I know that Vladimir Petrovich does not need that, he is fluent in both languages. Коллеги, добрый день, уже 12:35, поэтому уже день. Рад вас приветствовать на заседании, посвященном СВПД, а более конкретно, каким образом заключение Всеобъемлющего плана действий повлияло на сотрудничество ИРИ, международное сотрудничество с другими государствами в области мирного развития атомной энергетики. Напомню, что в рамках договоренностей, в рамках СВПД, или JCPOA, этому сотрудничеству посвящено приложение 3, Annex 3.

Для меня тема крайне интересная. В свое время, уже почти 20 лет назад, у меня выпускная работа в МИФИ была посвящена Бушерской АЭС и российско-иранскому сотрудничеству в области мирного использования атомной энергии, поскольку с тех пор, фактически я занимаюсь этой проблематикой, она мне близка к сердцу. В рамках нашего заседания хотели бы в первую очередь поговорить каким образом договоренность по СВПД повлияла на возможности сотрудничества с одной стороны, и на практическое сотрудничество, с другой стороны. В СВПД перечислены некоторые из проектов, в то же время хотелось бы поговорить и послушать иранских коллег, как они видят результат, эффект от заключения договоренности и для их возможностей, и, повторюсь, для практического сотрудничества, т.е. сотрудничества на земле в области мирного использования атомной энергии. При этом речь идет не только о сотрудничестве со странами-участницами договоренности в Вене от июля 2015 года, но и с другими государствами, которые обладают соответствующими технологиями.

Я коротко представлю наших докладчиков. Первым получит слово Владимир Петрович Кучинов, советник Генерального директора Государственной корпорации по атомной энергии «Росатом». Уверен, что Владимир Петрович не нуждается в представлениях в этой высокопрофессиональной аудитории. Владимир Петрович на протяжении многих лет работает в системе ГК

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<sup>1</sup> Recording of the session was decoded by Nadezhda **MASLENNIKOVA**, Intern, CENESS; and Anastasia **SHAVROVA**, Research Associate, CENESS.

<sup>2</sup> **КХЛОПКОВ** Anton, Director, Center for Energy and Security Studies (CENESS); Chairman, The 2017 Moscow Nonproliferation Conference, Russian Federation



«Росатом», работал в Вене. Многие годы занимается иранской проблематикой, уверен, куда больше чем те незначительные 20 лет, которые я сказал про себя. И он, в отличие от меня, занимается практической деятельностью, взаимодействием в т.ч. и с коллегами из Организации по атомной энергии Ирана. Следующим будет иметь слово Клемен Полак, глава отдела по вопросам каналов закупок в рамках СВПД. Клемен является советником Постоянного представительства ЕС при международных организациях в Вене. Клемен принимал непосредственное участие в переговорах по СВПД, но в этой аудитории было так много участников переговоров – где-то у нас еще Стефан Клемент, еще один из участников переговоров. Поэтому, к сожалению, во время первого пленарного заседания сегодня мы не могли всех участников пригласить на эту сцену, хотя я надеюсь, что через 10 лет, когда участники тех переговоров соберутся вместе, у нас будет возможность поблагодарить их не только за тот тяжелый труд, и, на мой взгляд, крайне, крайне качественный документ, который подготовили, но и вместе отметить жизнеспособность договоренности, которая сегодня, к сожалению, под угрозой по тем причинам, которые мы уже обсудили. После этого получит слово Чрезвычайный и полномочный посол Японии при международных организациях в Вене, Постоянный представитель Японии в Вене Посол Китано. Как мы знаем, Япония играет важную роль не только с точки зрения развития ядерных технологий, несмотря на те события, которые происходили на Фукусимской АЭС, но Япония играет важную и заметную роль в Международном агентстве по атомной энергии, и в рамках практической реализации тех договоренностей, которые были достигнуты в Вене. И после этого мы хотели бы послушать посла Резаи, генерального директора по вопросам международного сотрудничества Организации по атомной энергии. Как в Тегеране видят результаты СВПД с точки зрения влияния на возможность взаимодействия в области мирного использования атомной энергии. Я буду признателен, если каждый из докладчиков ограничит свое выступление семью минутами, чтобы у нас была возможность для небольшой дискуссии. Владимир Петрович, пожалуйста.

[KUCHINOV]<sup>3</sup> Спасибо, Антон. Прежде всего я хочу поблагодарить и тебя персонально, и Вашу организацию за приглашение меня на эту конференцию и возможность выступить на этой сессии и рассказать о нашем достаточно долгом взаимодействии и сотрудничестве с Ираном в области мирного использования ядерной энергии, и, собственно, в рамках СВПД. При этом я, все-таки, наверное, начну с сотрудничества, поскольку это сотрудничество имеет гораздо более длинную историю, чем сейчас, принятые, так сказать, недавно СВПД, а наше сотрудничество в августе этого года отметило свое 25-ти ление, поскольку в августе 1992 года было подписано межправительственное соглашение между Российской Федерацией и Исламской Республикой Иран об использовании ядерной энергии в мирных целях. И это соглашение установило принципы сотрудничества двух стран в этой сфере, и, в частности, определило в статье 5, что сотрудничество, являющееся предметом данного соглашения, служит целям

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исключительно мирного использования атомной энергии, и что ядерные и неядерные материалы и оборудование, произведенные на их основе и с их помощью, не используются для производства ядерного оружия или других ядерных взрывных устройств, а также для каких-либо военных целей. Находятся под гарантиями МАГАТЭ на протяжении всего периода их использования, обеспечиваются мерами физической защиты на уровне не ниже рекомендаций МАГАТЭ. Это соглашение предусматривает широкий спектр направлений, среди которых в начальный период его осуществления, только в общем надо сказать, что только два получили свое развитие. Поскольку тем же днем было заключено соглашение о продолжении строительства АЭС в Бушере, а в январе 1995 года было подписан контракт на завершение строительства первого энергоблока. Строительные работы выполнялись иранскими фирмами под техническим надзором российских специалистов; монтажные работы и поставка оборудования осуществлялись российскими организациями.

Необходимо отметить, что это сотрудничество полностью отвечало требованиям Договора о нераспространении ядерного оружия и Системе гарантий МАГАТЭ. Это было признано всеми, и даже в самый трудный период, связанный со всеми известными событиями вокруг иранской ядерной программы, не ставилось под сомнение и не подвергалось санкциям Совета Безопасности ООН. Строительство этого блока, а точнее встраивание ядерного реактора и оборудования российской конструкции в здание, которое было предназначено для реактора немецкой фирмы KWU (Kraftwerk Union) двигалось непросто, и являлось уникальным проектом, аналогов которому в мире не было. Но в конечном итоге, 11 сентября 2011 года первый энергоблок АЭС Бушер был подключен к энергосети, а в июне 2013 года введен в промышленную эксплуатацию. С этого момента блок работает надежно и безопасно, и к настоящему времени суммарная выработка электроэнергии составила более 24 млрд КВ/ч.

В настоящее время российско-иранское сотрудничество в строительстве АЭС российской конструкции продолжается. Российские специалисты начали работать в Иране по второй очереди АЭС Бушер, в рамках которой появится второй и третий энергоблоки этой станции. Эти блоки будут отвечать самым современным требованиям ядерной безопасности и относятся к поколению 3+. Безусловно, что такому развитию событий способствовала не только сложившаяся за время строительства первого АЭС Бушер доверия между партнерами, но и нахождение мировым сообществом, и прежде всего Ираном и странами т.н. «шестерки» решения по урегулированию проблем вокруг ядерной проблемы Ирана.

В июле этого года минуло два года с момента подготовки Ираном и группой стран Совместного Всеобъемлющего плана действий, который 20 июля 2015 года был одобрен резолюцией Совета Безопасности ООН 2231. Вместе с тем, начало практического его применения, и как следствие, снятие санкций, требовало от Ирана выполнения ряда действий. Одним из них было вывоз из Ирана всего обогащенного урана, имеющегося у него сверх предусмотренных СВПД пределов, не более 300 кг в форме гексафторида урана с обогащением до



3,67%. Принимая во внимание желательность скорейшего начала применения СВПД, руководство Ирана поставило задачу сделать это до конца 2015 года, и обратилось к России с просьбой оказать содействие в данном вопросе. Россия положительно откликнулась на эту просьбу. И уже через две недели после завершения работы над СВПД состоялись рабочие встречи российских и иранских специалистов для обсуждения контракта. Его особенность заключалась в том, что в обмен на вывезенные иранские ядерные материалы, Россия должна была поставить эквивалентный объем природного урана. Для этого необходимо было решать вопросы с транспортными контейнерами, поскольку таковых у Ирана не имелось.

В результате слаженной работы коллектива российских и иранских специалистов 21 октября 2015 года был подписан контракт по обмену иранского обогащенного урана на российский природный уран. После подписания контракта иранская сторона, видя наши успехи в решении основной задачи, заявило о своем желании привлечь Россию к вывозу ядерных материалов с обогащением выше 5%. Времени для решения этой задачи уже оставалось очень мало. Напомню, что мы были обязаны вывезти все до конца 2015 года. Поэтому пришлось решать тот же спектр задач, как и при вывозе основного продукта, но в более сжатые сроки. И совсем уж неожиданной стала задача вывезти годные изделия из Ирана на хранение в Российскую Федерацию. А в этот момент зафрахтованное российской стороной судно «Михаил Дудин» санкт-петербургской компании «АСПОЛ-Балтик» больше двух недель находилось в Персидском заливе. Иранская сторона с колес организовывала мероприятия по упаковке своих материалов в российские контейнеры. Здесь следует отметить и тесное сотрудничество с американскими коллегами в этом вопросе, которые в качестве залога за вывозимые полуфабрикаты поставили Ирану природный уран из Казахстана. И вот в тот день, когда в Иран прилетел самолет из Казахстана, последняя партия иранских материалов была погружена на судно «Михаил Дудин» и 28 декабря 2015 года в канун Нового года судно покинуло порт и взяло курс на Санкт-Петербург, куда и прибыло в феврале 2016 года. Это взаимодействие позволило МАГАТЭ подтвердить реализацию мероприятий, необходимых для начала полномасштабного осуществления СВПД и 16 января 2016 года было объявлено днем начала его реализации.

Наступление столь знаменательного события в столь сжатые сроки стало возможным в значительной степени благодаря слаженной работе и профессиональной работе российских и иранских специалистов. Все страны «шестерки» признали, что Россия, как участник СВПД, и страна, обладающая огромным опытом по перемещению и хранению ядерных материалов, сыграла важную роль, забрав эти материалы из Ирана и передав ему взамен природный уран. В сентябре 2016 года произошло еще одно важное событие в российско-иранском взаимодействии по СВПД в соответствии с подписанным контрактом в Россию была произведена поставка 38 т тяжелой воды в обмен на российский уран природного обогащения. Это позволило совместно с аналогичной операцией, проведенной США, решить на определенное время проблему значительного превышения запасов тяжелой воды в Иране над установленным в СВПД пределом в 130 т. В соответствии с положениями СВПД,



предусматривающими работу по модификации двух каскадов газовых центрифуг на заводе по обогащению урана в Фардо для выпуска стабильных изотопов, 19 января этого года в Москве был подписан контракт на проведение предпроектных работ по этому проекту.

[KHLOPKOV] Владимир Петрович, одна минутка.

[KUCHINOV] Хорошо. Они рассчитаны на полтора года и предусматривают, в частности, разный комплекс работ, с тем, чтобы в конечном итоге сформировать техническое задание на реальную модификацию этого контракта. В соответствии с докладом Генерального директора МАГАТЭ, Иран полностью выполняет взятые на себя обязательства в рамках СВПД и это открывает дорогу и к расширению сотрудничества с ним и в других областях, предусмотренных в российско-иранском межправительственном соглашении от 25 августа 1992 года, а также в Приложении 3 СВПД, которые, так сказать, могут стать основой. И хочу проинформировать, что накануне этой конференции 17-18 октября ГК «Росатом» совместно с Министерством иностранных дел Российской Федерации при участии Организации по атомной энергии Ирана провели семинар «25 лет сотрудничества между Россией и Ираном в сфере применения атомной энергии в мирных целях. Новые перспективы в соответствии с Приложением 3 СВПД».

Поскольку время уже практически заканчивается, я не буду более детально останавливаться на том, что было на семинаре, это можно прочесть в пресс-релизе, который размещен на сайте ГК «Росатом». Хочу только подчеркнуть, что семинар продемонстрировал мировой общественности, что Россия и Иран твердо намерены придерживаться положений СВПД, который рассматриваются ими в качестве сбалансированного документа, учитывающего интересы всех сторон, участвовавших в его разработке и принятии. Семинар также подтвердил позитивный настрой российских и иранских специалистов продолжать сотрудничество в обеспечении устойчивой реализации СВПД, а также в расширении взаимовыгодного сотрудничества в области мирного использования атомной энергии. Спасибо за внимание.

[KHLOPKOV] Спасибо, Владимир Петрович. Klemen, you have the floor.

[POLAK]<sup>4</sup> Thank you, Anton. And I am particularly happy to have a chance to speak on Annex 3 and that you organized and dedicated event to this particular part of the JCPOA, which is not so familiar to the others. But to stress that Annex 3 on civil nuclear cooperation was an essential element and is an essential element of the JCPOA. We have always considered it as somehow a positive element, which is balancing the other parts of the JCPOA, which are considered more of restrictive nature, because usually we are always talking about the nuclear restrictions or the sanctions side, but civil nuclear cooperation, and the details, the projects, which were, how to say, foreseeing Annex 3 of key importance.

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<sup>4</sup> **POLAK** Klemen, Head, JCPOA Procurement Channel Section; Counsellor, European Union Delegation to the International Organizations in Vienna



Of course, its implementation, which started from the very beginning of implementation, is ongoing. I will try to focus on two aspects: first, on civil cooperation and what the EU is doing in this area. And in my second part I will devote two minutes to the procurement channel, since I am also the Coordinator of the Procurement Working Group and somehow the procurement channel is also linked with civil nuclear cooperation projects. So I will try to divide these two aspects and focus a little bit.

So I do not think I need to repeat the importance of Annex 3 and in particular if it is developed properly, it makes the deal more durable, and of course, builds necessary confidence and at the same time it is increasing the transparency in the Iranian nuclear civil program. I think it is important. One of our ambitions is, of course, that we would reintegrate Iranian nuclear scientists into the international nuclear area, which is, of course, of importance after the years of somehow isolation, separation. I think it is an important element, which we are trying to pursue in our developing of our projects. You have heard many times that we are the pioneers and initiators, and started some, and Mr. Kuchinov also mentioned many projects, which Russia developed and disengaged over many years; of course, we immediately after the implementation of the JCPOA engaged with our Iranian colleagues in terms of concrete projects. It was mentioned in the morning session that at the beginning of this year we had a high-level seminar in Brussels, which was like a kick-off seminar focusing on two aspects: on nuclear governance and on concrete nuclear civil cooperation projects.

I think one of the important outcomes of this workshop was clear understanding that these two processes are mutually reinforcing and they need to be implemented in parallel. I think it is our common interest that Iran would accede to all important international conventions, legislations, which lay the groundwork for any kind of engagement either by states or the nuclear industry. So, accession to the relevant conventions, I think, is of key importance to build on civil nuclear cooperation projects. And allow me if I mention that we saw an extremely positive development during the last IAEA General Conference, when Dr. Salehi announced that Iran concluded, at least at the government level, the accession to the Joint Convention on the safety of spent fuel management and on safety of radiation, radioactive waste management. And this is now, how to say, it is in the processing the Parliament to be approved. I think this is an important development, positive development. Of course, accession to the other conventions is of particular importance and I think it is in our common interest that Iran would have in place the highest nuclear safety and security standards.

We, the EU, of course, attach particular importance to the area of nuclear safety, which is also one of the reasons why the first projects, which were developed and designed together with our Iranian colleagues, were focusing on improving the safety standards. We signed this year a multiannual and multimillion project under the instrument of nuclear safety cooperation, which is focusing on nuclear safety in cooperation with the Iranian regulators. Under this project currently we are conducting a feasibility study on the Nuclear Safety Center, which is one of the



commitments under the JCPOA. Another ongoing project is dedicated to the stress tests for the Bushehr nuclear power plant. And this project is also ongoing and I think it there should be concrete results, which would be presented hopefully by the end of the year. And it was mentioned also this morning by Ms. Schmid, that in one month, how to say, another high-level event is going to take place in Isfahan, but I think my Iranian colleague will say a little bit more about this. So there is an ongoing activity, which is, how to say, in the context of the EU engagement with our Iranian colleagues in the area of civil nuclear cooperation. Just briefly Mr. Kuchinov mentioned of course the important project with Russia is in developing its Fordo Stable Isotope Project. I would also mention the redesign project of the Arak research reactor where our Chinese and U.S. colleagues are in the lead. It is another concrete project with the being implemented since implementation day and positive development, and we have seen the positive development since then. It is not only the EU's engaging, we have seen the bilateral engagement by countries, who are also represented here as the pro-deal. And there is also engagement through the existing IAEA Technical Cooperation projects. So there is a variety of actors, which are engaging with Iran and this is extremely positive and we can only call on countries to extend their cooperation, of course, in full transparency, we, as the EU, trying to share a lot of information of our projects. We consult not only within the E3+3, but also with other countries, also in terms of to avoid somehow overlapping of the projects, which we foresee in terms of civil nuclear cooperation. We associate particular importance and civil nuclear cooperation Annex 3 is of key importance. And we hope if implemented properly, we will all benefit of the outcomes.

Now I will just briefly switch to another area of which is a procurement channel. I do not know how many of you are familiar but under the JCPOA we established a new authorization regime, which allows export of goods, items, materials, which are listed under the NSG, dual-use list or the trigger list. This is a fully transparent, a very straightforward mechanism, which is engaging the front-end and the back-end the Security Council. In between it is Procurement Group, which is composed of 7 countries: the E3+3 and Iran. We are, the EU, are functioning as a coordinator of this group. The group provides recommendations to the Security Council either to approve or disapprove transfer of item, material, good, which is listed. It is important to stress that this mechanism, although we had to design it from the scratch, has been in place since implementation day. It is functioning; states are submitting proposals to the Procurement channel; we provide our recommendations, mainly positive recommendations, which is also an important element to be observed; it is a well-designed mechanism with extremely clear timelines and modalities. And most of the information, all the information about the functioning of the mechanism is available on the dedicated UN Security Council webpage. Again, it is being used by states and I can assure you that we have faced with positive increase of proposals over the past few months. Of course, since it was a new mechanism, it required some time at the beginning to familiarize states and companies how to approach it, how to use it. But I can say that countries, which are exporting dual-use or sensitive items are now fully familiar with the modalities and they are also applying it. And the trend, as I said, is increasing and positive. And I think we can continue in this direction. Needless to say that it is an important transparency measure, which will remain in place for the next 8 years, we have it in place for one and a half year. And the specific arrangements under



this mechanism, which also require a end-use verification in case of dual-use items: an end-use verification is undertaken by a state, an exporting state. If you have a nuclear-related item, it is the mandate of the IAEA to verify the end-use. So it is not only the export on one side, but also the end-use verification part, which is, of course, of a particular importance as one of the elements of transparency. I would stop here and leave others some time open for discussions if there were any questions. Thank you.

[**KHLOPKOV**] Thank you, Klemen. Ambassador Kitano, please you have the floor.

[**KITANO**]<sup>5</sup> I also would like to thank Anton for inviting me to speak here. And today's topic is the JCPOA and the progress in civil nuclear cooperation with Iran. And this also happens within the whole structure of all political environment. So as for me, it has to revisit change. My presentation structure completely altered after the decision of President Trump. So the decision of President Trump is not much helpful for me, from that standpoint. But I decided to divide my presentation in two parts. One is how to maintain the JCPOA, and second, I would like to talk about how to work further from there. And the first in our topic is how to maintain the JCPOA. It is also related to our earlier discussion this morning with the architects of the JCPOA.

I hope my presentation has some value added to the extent that I am coming from the country, which is not a negotiating partner of the JCPOA. And I hope my presentation would give you some idea how non-negotiating partner of the JCPOA looks at the JCPOA. And I would like to mention that like others we support the JCPOA. We would like to see the JCPOA implemented by all the relevant parties and we have very much hope that it would be the case. At the same time, we have very much hope that Iran would play a constructive role in the region from the point of view of the stability of the region and respecting the UN Security Council resolution 2231. We would like to underline the importance of the JCPOA both from the standpoint of stability of the region and also from the standpoint of non-proliferation. As for Japan, not only being a non-negotiating partner of the JCPOA, but also we try to be helpful and to bring our support to the JCPOA from various levels.

One – political level, and you can hear a lot of supporting and commenting from our political leaders about the JCPOA. And financially Japan has been supporting the activities of the IAEA for verification and safeguards and related activities for the JCPOA, and also related activities, you can see that it would be 2.45 million euro. It is not small amount of money. And also we have been supporting the JCPOA for practical approach. As Helga Schmid mentioned about win-win, the same thing was mentioned by Mr. Polak. And it is a very important part of the JCPOA. So with this to happen, we have concluded Japan-Iran investment agreement. We have concluded a financing facilities memorandum of agreement with Iran. We have much hope that with the JCPOA a new era has come and we have much hope to economic activities in Iran. I mean activities with Iran, so we will be coming to a new stage. And this is one of the areas which we are doing. Mr. Polak mentioned about importance of

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<sup>5</sup> **KITANO** Mitsuru, Permanent Representative, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of Japan to the International Organizations in Vienna





cooperation through the IAEA. And that is one of the areas we are engaged in. We supported the IAEA Technical Cooperation Project on nuclear safety. And it is in the area of Bushehr power plant. The Bushehr power plant was mentioned several times at this panel. And it highlights the importance that this project plays for Iran. We play our humble role in supporting Technical Cooperation Project of the IAEA on nuclear safety. And safeguards and verification, it is another area we cooperate with Iran. And also there is an area of capacity-building. Recently there has been a seminar held in Japan and for inviting a number of Iranian experts and for them to have good understanding about what is a mechanism of safeguards, how it is implemented. And Japan is one of the countries, which has received the IAEA safeguard mechanism for quite a stable nature. And I suppose it is a good idea that we would share our experience with our Iranian colleagues and that is another area of what we have been doing. With this effort we have tried to support the framework of the JCPOA and it would bring benefit also for Iran. We also would like to support the mechanism itself.

And with that I would like to move to the second item and how to go further from that. I very much thank the order of speakers and very much thank Mr. Polak that took a floor before me. So I do not have to explain all the mechanism, and with JCPOA we have a new mechanism. So as it has been spelled out in Annex 3, and as it has been mentioned by Mr. Polak, it is through the mechanism of the Procurement Working Group that the transfer of related materials and so on will be executed. Then the question is from Japan's perspective how do you see the future prospects in cooperating with Iran in nuclear field? The answer I would provide that it is customary as Mr. Kuchinov mentioned, when it comes to nuclear cooperation it is usually concluding nuclear cooperation agreement and a way you do that. Then for this important consideration, when you finally conclude nuclear cooperation agreement. And let me mention that several areas where we did it and it is very much important: nuclear safety, nuclear security and safeguards, verification. And that also touches upon one of the points that Helga Schmid mentioned – international standard. This is something that we applied not only with Iran, but with other international partners when we concluded international nuclear cooperation agreements. I also would like to add that at some point we discussed about this, and one of the areas and verification safeguard. We have been attaching much importance to if a country has concluded, ratified the Additional Protocol and we suppose that as an important benchmark for the country's stance on non-proliferation.

And also I would like to mention what is called broader conclusion. It is something in which we would also discuss in that framework. Broader conclusion, and I am not quite sure to what extent you are familiar with that, is a judgement coming from the IAEA Secretariat and they have taken various measures of verification safeguards when they are satisfied. And they would judge and do a conclusion that all the related materials are for peaceful purposes. That is what we call a broader conclusion. And I would not be surprised that in discussing these things we would certainly discuss that kind of aspect in that kind of situation. So I would like to mention that as for the future orientation and it has been desirable – more confidence for the greater part of international community and would expand this cooperation in broader areas. That is what we would very much wish. I mentioned two sets of issues and one is how to support, how to maintain the JCPOA and the second is how to go further than that.



And from my standpoint like many TV games - if you are to praise second place, we have to clear the first race. And I suppose that it is something where international effort is pretty much needed and we should gather our collective forces to maintain the framework, with the JCPOA. Thank you very much for your attention.

[**KHLOPKOV**] Thank you, Ambassador Kitano. Our next speaker is Ambassador Ali Akbar Rezaei. Please.

[**REZAEI**]<sup>6</sup> First of all, Anton, let me seize this opportunity to extend my deep thanks for a very significant and timely job you and your colleagues have done. I also extend my deep thanks to the audience as well. In fact, Mr. Polak mentioned that Annex 3 of the JCPOA is an encouraging part of the deal. So I have to be very careful not to disappoint you and the audience here. Let us see what I can do. I would prefer to have an overview of all international cooperation before and after the implementation of the JCPOA if I may. I will try to be very brief. In fact, international nuclear cooperation of Iran goes back to its original interests in the nuclear industry in the aspect of the post-World War II “Atoms for Peace” program era. The construction of the Tehran research reactor by the United States in 1967, which is still operative, laid the foundation for our nuclear industry. The subsequent commercial nuclear cooperation gradually developed with the United States in 1970. In 1970 it was followed by more collaborative serious efforts with France and Germany - the well-known contracts made between Iran and these leading nuclear industries to construct new nuclear power plants in the south and the west of the country. At this stage Iran’s nuclear cooperation developed well so that it became significant shareholders of EURODIF of France and became shareholders of Rössing uranium mine in Namibia as well. This cooperation was mostly inconclusive especially with the inception of the Islamic revolution in Iran and in the wake of Saddam’s aggression against Iran in September 1980. Thus, the international cooperation came to a practical halt.

Soon after the end of the war in 1988, the interest in reviving the peaceful nuclear program reemerged as a matter of priority in demise of all political leadership. Hence, a new state of international cooperation developed with Russia and China. Iran signed a memorandum of understanding, agreements and relevant contracts for different projects. They became the major partners to develop our nuclear industry mainly by the construction of new power plant projects. The long-term efforts to provide the needed fuel for these nuclear power plants by starting uranium enrichment in Iran led to a serious disagreement with major Western countries. The drama that unfolded as of 2002 around the enrichment activities in one of the nuclear sites called the Natanz facility, pushed the issue of Iran nuclear program into a highly policy-motivated campaign. And that episode and its later development gradually stopped international cooperation of Iran to a large extent except for cooperation with Russia on the construction of Bushehr nuclear power plant.

The negotiations over Iran’ nuclear program lasted more than a decade, but as soon as the U.S. changed its negative stance on the policy of zero enrichment, the glimpse of

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<sup>6</sup> **REZAEI** Ali Akbar, Director General for International Affairs, Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI), Iran



hope transpired and unique and quite interesting, and I should say equally exciting and challenging negotiations ultimately culminated in a promising win-win nuclear deal called the JCPOA. Since the inception of the nuclear deal, our nuclear industry has entered a new era of international cooperation with the international partners. Almost two years after the implementation of the deal, let me share with you an overview of achievement of that cooperation. In order to have a clear understanding of what I mean by cooperation here I would like to differentiate the cooperation based on ends and those based on means. Literally speaking, cooperation means the process of working together to the same end. Nevertheless, in the deal as such it goes even beyond and cooperation is tacitly envisioned as a means as well. In other words, here we are dealing with a multilayer and multipurpose notion of cooperation.

As for cooperation within the JCPOA there are some areas of cooperation as the commitment between P5+1 and Iran. And some of them were mentioned by the colleagues. Those areas divided in before and after the implementation of the deal, although the latter are still going on, the former ones have been obviously concluded. In addition, the deal allows Iran to establish its cooperation with the international parties in different fields. Therefore, if the international cooperation within the framework of the JCPOA under Annex 3 achieves the anticipated results, one may expect the followings.

First, the cooperation helps the both sides trust each other after all the sides of the deal may have been suffering from lack of trust and a genuine cooperation may establish a confidence-building measurements through a close and constant interaction. Second, the cooperation is an approval of transparency in a given nuclear program. The more one has the nuclear cooperation, the more transparent it is. If a country has nothing to hide, it welcomes the cooperation. And if the main concern of interlocutors is transparency, then there should be no excuse for a broader international cooperation. Third, based on the reality of a normal business in a new era that no one can do it alone. Now the international partners in the nuclear industry is a must and nobody can ignore this proven fact. Accordingly, they have established a reliable set of cooperations with the major international stakeholders in the new industry since the implementation of the JCPOA. To name a few of them, I would like to mention cooperation with Russia, China and European countries. The cooperation with Russia explained in detail by Mr. Kuchinov, my good colleague, and I am not going to repeat that again. And I do confirm all the cooperation mentioned by him, including the conference we had recently in Moscow.

Our cooperation with China includes the modernization and reconstruction of the Arak heavy water research reactor and consultation contract has been signed and the cooperation is moving forward smoothly. There is also developing cooperation between Iran and the European Union in different fields safety issues as well as the nuclear application in medicine, industry and agriculture. And this morning madam Schmid mentioned also the possibility of more cooperation between Iran and Euratom. A growing number of substantial cooperation is developing with European countries. We have signed a relevant and required documents together to finalize a long procedure of projects commencement. And in this area we need help and support of Mr. Polak and his colleagues, because many of them are pending to that decision.



As an overall assessment, I would like to say that all these cooperations are valuable and Iran has taken its part very seriously. However, one may not ignore the delays in the final decision-making due to different reasons, including the constant changes in the political environment at the international level. All in all, I am cautiously optimistic about the prospects of cooperation if the JCPOA remains intact and alive. Those of our international partners, who have initiated the cooperation with Iran, should be reminded that their contribution is having a broader impact not only in establishing better relations with Iran and observing countries, but also they are contributing to the viability and credibility of the existing of international legal regime, including the Non-proliferation Treaty. Thank you for your attention.

[**KHLOPKOV**] Спасибо, посол Резаи. У нас есть 20 минут, чтобы задать вопросы участникам. Я предлагаю сфокусироваться на вопросах, и если останется время, перейти к комментариям. Оливер Мейер.

[**MEYER**]<sup>7</sup> Thank you very much. I have one general question and two specific questions. My general question would be the importance of the U.S. participation in nuclear cooperation projects. Is it possible to envision this type of cooperation if the U.S. ends participating in this integral part of the JCPOA? You mentioned that the U.S. with China is in the lead on Arak that it is the member of the Procurement Working Group and it is in the institutions. How can we envision and have you seen the change since the Trump Administration took office in U.S. participation in these institutions?

My first specific question is to Mr. Kuchinov on the Russian cooperation projects, there are also plans for expanding Russian cooperation with Iran with regard to additional reactors and also nuclear fuel fabrication plant in Iran. If you could update us on those plans that would be very interesting. And to Mr. Polak - you mentioned a rather innovative and unique aspect of procurement channel and it is the end-use verification, which is something that we do not have any other dual-use export arrangements. So I am curious whether how it is working, whether it has been implemented yet, and whether you think it could be something that could usefully be applied in other contexts. Thanks very much.

[**KHLOPKOV**] We will collect a few questions. Ali Ahmad next.

[**AHMAD**]<sup>8</sup> Well, thanks for the panel. I will have two questions for Ambassador Rezaei. First question, it is really great to hear about these international cooperation agreements, but as you are aware, sever countries in the Middle East are also pursuing nuclear programs, most of which do not make any sense, but this may be subject to a different debate, but based on that, do you foresee or do you envisage also some form

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<sup>7</sup> **MEIER** Oliver, Deputy Head, Research Division on International Security, German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP), Germany

<sup>8</sup> **AHMAD** Ali, Director, Program on Energy Policy and Security in the Middle East, Issam Fares Institute for Public Policy and International Affairs, American University of Beirut (AUB), Lebanon



of cooperation with these countries? I know it takes two to tango, but at least from Iran's perspective is there any possibilities for cooperation?

My second question is that yesterday we heard the deputy of Rosatom who naturally gave a favorable presentation on nuclear power, but the reality of the matter in the Middle East is the place is not very far from Iran, we have seen the breakthroughs in renewable energy and breaking records in prices. So to what extent do you see this advancement in renewables, particularly with the potential of coupling good natural gas, which Iran holds a lot of in actually downplaying expansion nuclear power, not yielding to particular pressure, but, perhaps, maybe more economic perspective? Thank you.

[KHLOPKOV] Tariq Rauf.

[RAUF]<sup>9</sup> Thank you, Anton. The IAEA Director-General on several occasions highlighted the importance of cybersecurity of nuclear facilities and Ambassador Kitano has also mentioned cybersecurity. So my question to Mr. Rezaei and Mr. Polak is to what extent there is cooperation on cybersecurity? Mr. Polak mentioned cooperation on nuclear safety, but I understand there is reluctance in the EU to assist Iran in the area of cybersecurity, and if that is the case, that is quite worrying, because it leaves open the possibility of vulnerabilities. And over the past few years several nuclear power plants have been affected by those persistent threats, there have been outrages, there have been losses of coolance and so on, so this is a very serious and important question. And to Mr. Kuchinov I would just like to develop all of these questions, extend a little bit on future power plants, export to Iran, because Iran at one point as mentioned up to 10 power plants as their requirement. Thank you.

[KHLOPKOV] We have time for one more final question and then we will give the floor. Laura.

[ROCKWOOD]<sup>10</sup> Yes. Klemen, I wonder if you could give us some statistics on numbers of requests, numbers of approvals, numbers of denials. And as suggested by, I think, our Iranian colleague, a number in backlog.

[KHLOPKOV] Thank you. Ambassador Rezaei. I allow you to go first.

[REZAEI] Ok, thank you so much. In fact, about the U.S. role and its involvement in the implementation of Annex 3. Even before the Trump Administration I would say it was, it has not been promising even beforehand. And what is limited, this part of the deal and even it is worse after the new administration came to power. And I can give you many examples that they impeded not only their own involvement into international cooperation with us, but also they discouraged others explicitly from having cooperation peacefully and very normal cooperation of other countries with us.

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<sup>9</sup> RAUF Tariq, Fmr. Head of Verification and Security Policy Coordination, Office of External Relations and Policy Coordination; Alternate Head of IAEA NPT Delegation, International Atomic Energy Agency (2002-2011), Canada

<sup>10</sup> ROCKWOOD Laura, Executive Director, Vienna Center for Disarmament and Non-Proliferation (VCDNP), United States/Austria



So we do not credit the U.S. for implementation of this part of the deal. About the regional cooperation, we have no reservation to any further regional cooperation with the regional countries, especially in the Persian Gulf area. And we do much encourage them to have better further cooperation regionally. And for example, Euratom program can be a good successful model for cooperation and why not we do it in the region? We have nothing to be worried about, it is up to our neighboring countries to take their own share.

Regarding the need for Iran to have nuclear power plants and also regarding having a large gas reserve, I will just direct you to the achievement of the IAEA, not our own assessment, as a major source of assessment based on the software, they have produced to have an assessment for the countries and different areas how much they need in nuclear power plant, they say that Iran at least 8-12% need to have power plant, whereas in one nuclear power plant we have utmost 2%. So you see at this we are far behind from what the IAEA has recommended for us. About cybersecurity cooperation you are absolutely right. We have not started cooperation with the EU in this area, but we are very interested to establish this cooperation. Hopefully in the framework we are working nowadays with the European Union. I think it can be considered seriously.

By the way, our cooperation with the EU is totally different from the US and we are at a very good stage. As it was mentioned during the previous sessions, we held one of the very successful high-level seminar in Brussels and we have a very good participation not only Europeans and Iranian participation, but also the involvement of the representative of the 5+1. We are going to expand our cooperation. We have established two working groups on R&D and safety. On safety we had very tangible and good results. On R&D we are working and discussing the areas of cooperation. And it is very promising in the future and I am sure it can be also another issue to be taken into account for further cooperation.

**[KHLOPKOV]** Thank you. Ambassador Kitano, if you have anything you would like to react to.

**[KITANO]** Yes, thank you very much. As it has been mentioned this morning, the JCPOA is an international framework. And my understanding is, for example, the IAEA will continue to exercise its own function and based on the observation of the Board of Governors and also language of the resolution of the UN Security Council. And it is a very much important thing in thinking about the future of nuclear cooperation in this area. We are in the JCPOA world. And so quite the JCPOA world has to exist. As it was mentioned by Ambassador Rezaei, the JCPOA is alive. And that would be a very much important thing we should look into. And I mentioned several things to be considered in the second part in my presentation. And how the JCPOA is implemented? That is the first and foremost, very much important considerations. And how we go forward in this area. Thank you very much.

**[KHLOPKOV]** Thank you. Klemen.



[POLAK] Thank you. To the questions about U.S. engagement, the ways how the U.S. could engage in technical civil nuclear cooperation projects. First I mentioned one concrete project, which is the Arak modernization project. And here the U.S. together with China are in the lead and this project has been ongoing since the implementation day. And now we have not seen any decrease in the level of engagement from the U.S. side. In terms of how the U.S. could engage on other civil nuclear cooperation projects, it is difficult for me to say, you know, they have restrictions in place. But one of the options, which I think I heard is through the IAEA technical cooperation, which is one way, which offers the U.S. to support projects, which are along the listed technical cooperation projects of the IAEA. This is one way, but it is difficult for me to speak on other options due to the restrictions, which remain in place. In terms of the end-use verification, it a straightforward approach in terms that when a state submits a proposal to the Security Council it also has to submit an end-use certificate, which would be signed by the Iranian authorities in case it is a nuclear-related item, it need to be signed by the Iranian Atomic Energy Organization, in case it is for dual-use, it is the Ministry of Trade and Mines, which is responsible. Based on this certificate and, let us say, its recognition, the exporting state has the permission to verify the item, good or technology, which has been transferred to Iran.

For dual-use it is the state for the IAEA, for the nuclear-related it is the IAEA and based on their existing verification and practices they are conducting with this kind of activities. Although we had proposals, which were approved by the Procurement Channel, the shipment or the transfer concretely to Iran mostly has not yet taken place, it takes time and it cannot speak of concrete cases how the end-use has been undertaken, because I think it still has to be done in the coming month, but for some items, which were shipped. But it is a state responsibility. So far we had not any guidelines on the way how this could be conducted, but it is based on a state decision. Once we have some practices or lessons learned, of course, we will be happy to share it with interested countries. But it is on a state responsibility. I can only say that we are thinking about having special teams from capitals, including some members from the embassies, but as I said, it will depend on a state decision how to apply. But it is an important transparency measure, assuring measure, which will remain in place on listing to the export of items and materials to Iran. Once we have more concrete information, we can share it and maybe some practices can be shared.

Cybersecurity. I looked again through the areas of civil nuclear cooperation and cybersecurity is not among them. I stressed before that for the moment our primary focus is on nuclear safety and security, and cybersecurity is not one of the priorities which we defined in the list of activities on civil nuclear cooperation projects. Numbers. I do not know all the numbers by heart, but I think last year we had 6 or 7 proposals. This year we already have 19. We are reporting every six months to the Security Council. Our report is public and also the Secretary-General makes the information available to the whole international community. We had a steady increase, and most of the proposals were approved. There were one or two cases, which were disapproved so far, which also shows that states, which are submitting proposals, do a serious review before a submitting a proposal and this is an important step, which is taken place before. Any state submits, it needs to go through its national export



system, reviewing system and then they submit to the Security Council. It is an increase; 99% of proposals were dual-use items for automotive industry, pharmaceutical industry. So these are the areas and these are mainly machine tools and equipment, so these are some statistics I can share now from the top of my head.

One important aspect in the procurement channel as much as we want to be also transparent and share as much as possible, but there is also confidentiality, since we have to respect property rights, we need to respect some of the information in the application itself, but in terms of statistics I can have a look on some figures but in six months we are publishing in our report to the Security Council the numbers are there and also the statistics what was approved and what was disapproved. But as for now there is an increasing trend, which is positive and we have concrete things exported to Iran. That I think were the questions I received.

[KHLOPKOV] Владимир Петрович.

[KUCHINOV] Спасибо. Ну я тоже, наверное, начну с общего вопроса, который, как я понимаю, был задан всем. Это относительно предположения если США завершат свое участие каким-то образом, потому что юридически я не вижу возможности каким-то либо образом свое участие в СВПД. Я полагаю, что это самое негативное развитие событий, самый негативный сценарий, которого бы следовало избежать всеми возможными способами. Я здесь выражаю свое личное мнение, я полагаю, что, если Соединенные Штаты примут окончательное решение и решат, как я сказал, каким-то образом выйти из СВПД, с моей точки зрения, они просто его разрушат со всеми вытекающими отсюда последствиями. Это к общему замечанию, а теперь к конкретным вопросам.

Относительно Вашего же вопроса по фабрикации, я бы начал с вопроса уважаемого господина Рауфа о перспективах строительства АЭС, потому что вопрос фабрикации именно связан с этим. В настоящий момент, по всем, так сказать, условно говоря, имеющимся документам и договоренностям, в настоящий момент планируется строительство до 8 блоков АЭС российского дизайна, большой мощности, где-то 1000-1200 МВт. Как известно, на второй и третий блок уже подписаны все необходимые контракты, и работы по сооружению этих блоков начались. Разговоры про четвертый, пятый еще не начались, хотя подразумевается, что они начнутся в ближайшем будущем. Дальнейшие блоки еще пока в перспективе, и будут ли они на площадке Бушер или на новых – еще тоже пока не определено, но общий прогноз сотрудничества – это до 8 энергоблоков. И вот здесь мы сейчас переходим к вопросу о производстве топлива. Да, такая тема существует в этом соглашении, о котором я сегодня говорил. Обсуждение этой темы тоже ведется, подписаны соответствующие протоколы и меморандумы, которые увязывают сотрудничество в производстве топлива с наращиванием мощностей атомных станций в Иране. По оценкам наших специалистов, собственное производство топлива для атомных станций, если у вас меньше 8 энергоблоков, тысячников, то оно экономически нерентабельно. Поэтому по мере строительства энергоблоков, по мере увеличения мощностей в Иране будет соответственно





будет развиваться сотрудничество в области и фабрикации. Начиная с таких вещей, как обучение, производство комплектующих изделий и, в перспективе, возможно непосредственно сооружение производств по производству топлива для реакторов российского дизайна и, может быть, и не российского тоже.

Вот, собственно, как я понимаю, это два вопроса, которые были адресованы непосредственно ко мне, но я бы еще хотел бы ответить на вопрос, связанный с компьютерной безопасностью. С моей точки зрения, просто вычленять из сотрудничества тему такую, как компьютерная безопасность, не совсем корректно. Потому, что сказали, что были попытки влиять через компьютерные программы на функционирование станций, на расхолаживание и т.д. Если у вас станция построена со всеми необходимыми параметрами в рамках ядерной безопасности, то некоторые вещи, даже через внешнее воздействие по компьютерам, они, в общем-то, проблематичны. Хотя, безусловно, тема общей безопасности станций, как ядерная, так и физическая, так и информационная, компьютерная, она, безусловно, присутствует, и в той или иной мере включается в программы сотрудничества. Вот это я бы хотел прокомментировать отдельно. Спасибо.

[KHLOPKOV] Спасибо, Владимир Петрович. Спасибо всем докладчикам. Времени у нас нет, но и с другой стороны, это показывает замечательный тайминг. Давайте поблагодарим наших докладчиков. Please, join me to applaud the speakers. Хотел бы обратить внимание, что наше следующее заседание начнется ровно через 1 час 14 минут, и обратите внимание, что в программе есть изменения. Секция по проблематике противодействия оружию массового уничтожения пройдет в этом зале, поскольку коллега многих здесь присутствующих Владимир Иванович Воронков, бывший постоянный представитель Российской Федерации при международных организациях в Вене, а сейчас занимающий пост в Нью-Йорке свяжется с нами посредством современных технологий и нам нужно для этого видео, поэтому заседание пройдет здесь. Те из вас, кто хотел бы принять участие в заседании, посвященном конференции по созданию на Ближнем Востоке зоны, свободной от ОМУ, это заседание пройдет в зале Петергофский-Шереметьевский. Обед готов и ждет нас внизу в ресторане «Самобранка». Приятного аппетита.